The IMF has been sending out some very confused signals from its spring meeting, being held in Brazil this week. If I have read the bulletins that I have received correctly, and appropriately interpreted them within the context of the UK, which some of them specifically address, then the messages appear to be at least fourfold.

Firstly, they are not convinced that the risk of inflation in the UK is over as yet, and so are demanding caution.

Second, they have downgraded UK growth expectations for the year to well under one percent. That appears realistic, especially if in response the their demands on inflation interest rates stay above any reasonably required level.

Third, they suggest that there is no room for tax cuts, which is a political rather than an economic choice on their part, although it is one that I would support.

Fourth, they do, instead of tax cuts, demand investment in public services.

However, and fifth, they also expect that government debt be constrained.

In principle, these various claims are reconcilable. However, they do require a very particular political economic perspective to be taken, which embraces the idea that the capacity of the state is limited, that the creation of money is exogenous to it, and that priority must always be given to private sector activity, even if the basic needs of many are not met.

It really is time that the IMF worked out what the economic priorities of the 21st-century are. In particular, they should appreciate the promoting an environment in which the interests of rent-extracting global monopolies are prioritised is never going to meet the needs of most people.  When they have got over serving the interests of that lobby group, we might get more coherent policy from them.

In the face of soaring wealth inequality, Ingrid Robeyns‘ Limitarianism: The Case Against Extreme Wealth calls for restrictions on individual fortunes. Robeyns puts forward a strong moral case for imposing wealth caps, though how to navigate the political and practical hurdles involved remains unclear, writes Stewart Lansley.

Watch a YouTube recording of an LSE event where Ingrid Robeyns spoke about the book.

Limitarianism: The Case Against Extreme Wealth. Ingrid Robeyns. Allen Lane. 2023.

Ingrid Robeyns’ Limitarianism is the latest in a long line of critiques – such as Thomas Piketty’s Capital and Branko Milanovic’s Visions of Inequality – of the soaring wealth and income gaps of recent decades. Limitarianism focuses on personal wealth, which is much more unequally distributed than incomes, and is arguably the most urgent of these trends. It draws most closely on the United States, where, according to Forbes, nine of the world’s top 15 billionaires are citizens.

Robeyns argues that given the wider damage from the enrichment of the few, with its negative impact on economic strength and on wider life chances and social resilience, we must now impose a limit on individual wealth holdings. Thinkers have been making the case for this “limitarianism” and the capping of business rewards for centuries. The Classical Greek Philosopher, Plato, argued that political stability required the richest to own no more than four times that of the poorest. The Gilded Age financier, J. P. Morgan – one of the most powerful of American plutocrats of the nineteenth century – maintained that executives should earn no more than twenty times the pay of the lowest paid worker.  In 1942, President Roosevelt proposed a 100 percent top tax rate, stating that “[n]o American citizen ought to have a net income, after he has paid his taxes, of more than $25,000 a year (about $1m in today’s terms).” “The most forthright and effective way of enhancing equality within the firm would be to specify the maximum range between average and maximum compensation”, wrote the influential American economist J. K. Galbraith in 1973.

The Gilded Age financier, J. P. Morgan […] maintained that executives should earn no more than twenty times the pay of the lowest paid worker.

One of the effects of the 2008 financial crisis was to trigger a debate about the role played by excessive compensation packages in banking. Others have argued that the introduction of guaranteed minimum wages – which limits employer freedom over employees – should come with a maximum too. As wealth inequality has deepened in recent decades, there have been growing calls for measures to reduce this concentration, not least among some members of the global super-rich club. Yet there has been perilously little political action. Each year the world’s mega-rich, facing few constraints, carry on appropriating a larger share of national and global wealth pools.

Robeyns sets out a powerful moral case against today’s wealth divide and asks the all-important question: “how much is too much?”. She calls for setting limits to the size of individual fortunes that would vary across countries. In the case of the Netherlands, where she lives, “we should aim to create a society in which no one has more than €10m. There shouldn’t be any decamillionaires.” This, she argues should be politically imposed. She also adds a second aspirational goal, an appeal to a new voluntary moral code applied by individuals themselves: “I contend that … the ethical limit [on wealth] will be around 1 million pounds, dollars or euros per person.”

Although there are many critics who dismiss the philosophical concept as either unfeasible or undesirable, history suggests the idea is far from utopian. Limits operated pretty effectively among nations – including the UK and the US – in the post-war decades and became an important instrument in the move towards greater equality.

War has long proved a powerful equalising force, and the post-1945 decades brought peak egalitarianism.

War has long proved a powerful equalising force, and the post-1945 decades brought peak egalitarianism. States shifted from their pre-war pro-inequality role to become agents of equality. This brought (albeit temporary) upward pressure on the lowest incomes and downward pressure on the highest. These limits operated in two ways: through regulation and taxation, and changes in cultural norms. Nations imposed highly progressive tax systems, with especially high tax rates at the top – that were sustained in the UK until the 1980s – the expansion of protective welfare states, and a shift in bargaining power from the boardroom to the workforce.

These policies were also enabled by a significant pro-equality cultural shift. This brought a tighter check on top business rewards and the size of fortunes. Until the early 1980s, business behaviour became more restrained, and wealth gaps narrowed. The kind of business appropriation that has become so widespread today would, for the most part, have been unacceptable to public and political opinion then. Gone were the public displays of extravagance and the high living of the inter-war years. Up to the 1970s, and the return of what Edward Heath called the “unacceptable face of capitalism”, executive salaries in the UK were moderated by a kind of hidden “shame gene”, an unwritten social code – similar in some ways to Robeyns’ call for voluntary limits – which acted as a check on greed. It was a code that was largely adhered to, partly because of fear of public outrage towards excessive wealth.

Up to the 1970s, and the return of what Edward Heath called the ‘unacceptable face of capitalism’, executive salaries in the UK were moderated by a kind of hidden ‘shame gene’

Robeyns is making a conceptual case. She doesn’t give much detail of how limitarianism might work in practice, and doesn’t draw lessons from the post-war experience (though this was the product of the particular circumstances of the time). She recognises the hurdles needed to make the politics of limitarianism a reality. There are plenty of questions of detail that would need to be settled. How, as a society, would we determine the appropriate “rich lines” above which is too much? Would the “undeserving rich” whose wealth is achieved by extraction that hurts wider society, be treated differently from the ‘deserving’ who through exceptional skill, effort and risk-taking, create new wealth in ways that benefit others as well as themselves?

The expectation that the tremors of the 2008 meltdown would trigger a shift towards a more progressive governing philosophy that embraced a more equal sharing of wealth has failed to materialise.

The greatest hurdle is political. The expectation that the tremors of the 2008 meltdown would trigger a shift towards a more progressive governing philosophy that embraced a more equal sharing of wealth has failed to materialise. The pro-market, anti-state politics of recent decades are now largely discredited. International Monetary Fund staff, for example, have called neoliberal politics “oversold”. There are widespread calls for the reset of capitalism, with as Robeyns puts it, “a more considerate, values-based economic system”. Although such a system may yet emerge, there are few signs of the kind of value-shift and new cultural norms that would be a pre-condition for a politics of restraint and limitarianism.

This post gives the views of the author, and not the position of the LSE Review of Books blog, or of the London School of Economics and Political Science.

Image Credit: dvlcom on Shutterstock.

[Note: this is a slightly edited ChatGPT translation of an article for the Italian daily Domani]

Last week’s piece of news is the gap that opened between the US central bank, the Fed, and the European and British central banks. Apparently, the three institutions have adopted the same strategy, deciding to leave interest rates unchanged, in the face of falling inflation and a slowdown in the economy. But, for central banks, what you say is just as important as what you do; and while the Fed has announced that in the coming months (barring surprises, of course) it will begin to loosen the reins, reducing its interest rate, the Bank of England and the ECB have refused to announce cuts anytime soon.

To understand why the ECB remains hawkish, one can read  the interview with  the Financial Times  of the governor of the Central Bank of Belgium, Pierre Wunsch, one of the hardliners within the ECB Council. Wunsch argues that, while inflation data is good (it is also worth noting that, as many have been saying for months, inflation continues to fall faster than forecasters expect), wage dynamics are a cause for concern. In the Eurozone, in fact, these rose by 5.3% in the third quarter of 2023, the highest pace in the last ten years. The Belgian Governor mentions the risk that this increase in wages will weigh on the costs of companies, inducing them to raise prices and triggering further wage demands; As long as wage growth is not under control, Wunsch concludes, the brakes must be kept on. Once again, the restrictive stance is justified by the risk of a price-wage spiral, that so far never materialized, despite having been evoked by the partisans of rate increases since 2021. Those who, like Wunsch, fear the wage-price spiral, cite the experience of the 1970s, when the wage surge had effectively fueled progressively out-of-control inflation. The comparison seems apt at first glance, given that in both cases it was an external shock (energy) that triggered the price increase. But, in fact, it was not necessary to wait for inflation to fall to understand that the risk of a wage-price spiral was overestimated and used by many as an instrument. Compared to the 1970s, in fact, many things have changed. I talk about this in detail  in Oltre le Banche Centrali, recently published by Luiss University Press (in Italian): Automatic indexation mechanisms have been abolished, the bargaining power of trade unions has greatly diminished and, in general, the precarization of work has reduced the ability of workers to carry out their demands. For these and other reasons, the correlation between prices and wages has been greatly reduced over three decades.

But the 1970s are actually the exception, not the norm. A recent study by researchers at the International Monetary Fund looks at historical experience and shows that, in the past, inflationary flare-ups have generally been followed with a delay by wages. These tend to change more slowly than prices, so that an increase in inflation is not followed by an immediate adjustment in wages and initially there is a reduction in the real wage (the wage adjusted for the cost of living). When, in the medium term, wages finally catch up with prices, the real wage returns to the equilibrium level, aligned with productivity growth. If the same thing were to happen at this juncture, the IMF researchers believe, we should not only expect, but actually hope for nominal wage growth to continue to be strong for some time in the future, now that inflation has returned to reasonable levels: looking at the data published by Eurostat, we observe that for the eurozone, prices increased by 18.5% from the third quarter of 2020 to the third quarter of 2023,  while wage growth stopped at 10.5%. Real wages, therefore, the measure of purchasing power, fell by 8.2%. Italy stands out: it has seen a similar evolution of prices (+18.9%), but an almost stagnation of wages (+5.8%), with the result that purchasing power has collapsed by 13%.

Things are worse than these numbers show. First, for convergence to be considered accomplished, real wages will have to increase beyond the 2021 levels. In countries where productivity has grown in recent years, the new equilibrium level of real wages will be higher. Second, even when wages have realigned with productivity growth, there will remain a gap to fill. During the current transition period, when real wages are below the equilibrium level, workers are enduring a loss of income that will not be compensated for (unless the real wage grows more than productivity for some time). From this point of view, therefore, it is important not only that the gap between prices and wages is closed, but that this happens as quickly as possible.

In short, contrary to what many (more or less in good faith) claim, the fact that at the moment wages are growing more than prices is not the beginning of a dangerous wage-price spiral and the indicator of a return of inflation; rather, it is the foreseeable second phase of a process of rebalancing that, as the IMF researchers point out, is not only normal but also necessary.

The conclusion deserves to be emphasized as clearly as possible: if the ECB or national governments tried to limit wage growth with restrictive policies, they would not only act against the interests of those who paid the highest price for the inflationary shock. But, in a self-defeating way, they would prevent the adjustment from being completed and delay putting once and for all the inflationary shock behind us.