workers rights
The Inequality of Wealth: Why it Matters and How to Fix it – review
In The Inequality of Wealth: Why it Matters and How to Fix it, Liam Byrne examines the UK’s deep-seated inequality which has channelled wealth away from ordinary people (disproportionately youth and minority groups) and into the hands of the super-rich. While the solutions Byrne presents – from boosting wages to implementing an annual wealth tax – are not new, the book synthesises them into a coherent strategy for tackling this critical problem, writes Vamika Goel.
Liam Byrne launched the book at an LSE event in February 2024: watch it back on YouTube.
The Inequality of Wealth: Why it Matters and How to Fix it. Liam Byrne. Bloomsbury. 2024.
Wealth inequality, a pressing issue of our times, reinforces all other forms of inequality, from social and political to ecological inequality. In The Inequality of Wealth, Liam Byrne recognises this fact and emphasises the need to move away from a narrow focus on addressing income inequality. He reaffirms the need to deal with wealth inequality and address the issue of inequality holistically.
The book adopts a multi-pronged approach to addressing wealth inequality in the UK. It is divided into three parts. The first part discusses the extent of wealth inequality and how it affects democracy and damages meritocracy. The second part discusses the emergence of neoliberalism which has promoted unequal distribution of resources, while the third part proposes corrective measures to reverse wealth inequality.
According to Forbes, the world’s billionaires have doubled from 1001 to 2640 during 2010 and 2022, adding around £7.1 trillion to their combined wealth.
The first chapter reflects on the exorbitant surge in wealth globally during the past decade, primarily enjoyed by the world’s super-rich. According to Forbes, the world’s billionaires have doubled from 1001 to 2640 during 2010 and 2022, adding around £7.1 trillion to their combined wealth. In the UK, wealth disparity has risen, with the top 10 per cent holding about half of the wealth while the bottom 50 per cent held only 5 per cent in Great Britain in 2018-20, as per the Wealth and Assets Survey. Byrne claims that this inequality has only been exacerbated in recent years. Despite adverse negative shocks like the COVID-19 pandemic, austerity, and Brexit, about £87 billion has been added to UK billionaire’s wealth during 2021 and 2023.
The book highlights that youth have borne the brunt of this widening wealth disparity. According to data from Office of National Statistics (ONS), those aged between twenty and forty, hold only eight per cent of Britain’s total wealth. In contrast, people aged between fifty-five and seventy-five owned over half of Britain’s total wealth in 2018-20. Their prospects of wealth accumulation have further declined with a squeeze in wages and booming asset prices as a result of quantitative easing. Byrne contends that this has made Britain an “inheritocracy” wherein a person’s parental wealth, social connections and the ability to access good education are more important determinants of wealth than hard work and talent.
Those aged between twenty and forty, hold only eight per cent of Britain’s total wealth.
The second part of the book explores the spread of the idea of neoliberalism since the 1980s, that helped sustain and flourish wealth inequality. Neoliberalism promoted the idea of market supremacism and reduced the role of the state. The later chapters in this section engage in depth with rent-seeking behaviour by corporates and the increase in market concentration via mergers and acquisitions.
The third part of the book proposes corrective measures needed to reverse wealth inequality. The book contends that the starting point of arresting wealth disparity is to boost labour incomes by creating well-paying, knowledge-intensive jobs. Byrne does not elucidate as to what he means by these knowledge-intensive jobs. Usually, knowledge-intensive jobs are those in financial services, high-tech manufacturing, health, telecommunications, and education. Byrne argues that earnings in knowledge-intensive jobs are about 30 per cent higher than average pay. However, these jobs accounted for only about a fifth of all jobs and a quarter of economic output in 2021. Hence, promoting such jobs will significantly raise workers’ earnings.
The author maintains that knowledge-intensive jobs can be generated by giving impetus to state-backed research and development (R&D) spending and innovation. He draws attention to low growth in R&D spending in UK at per cent between 2000 and 2020, when global R&D spending has more than tripled to £1.9 trillion. However, there are some fundamental concerns regarding the effectiveness of such reforms in curbing inequality and ensuring social mobility.
People of Black African ethnicity are disproportionately employed in caring, leisure and other service-based occupations. They also hold about eight times less wealth than their white counterparts.
First, knowledge-intensive jobs are highly capital-intensive and high R&D spending may not generate enough jobs or may make some existing jobs redundant. The author has not substantiated his claim with any empirical evidence. Second, it’s possible that innovation spending and jobs perpetuate the existing social and regional inequalities. In the UK, about half of all knowledge-intensive jobs are generated in just two regions: London and the South East. To address regional disparities, Byrne suggests setting up regional banks, training skills and integration at the regional level, and promoting Research and Development (R&D) in small and medium enterprises (SMEs) via tax credits and innovation vouchers. However, no mechanism is laid out with which to tackle social inequality. People of Black African ethnicity are disproportionately employed in caring, leisure and other service-based occupations. They also hold about eight times less wealth than their white counterparts. It seems likely that new knowledge-intensive jobs would disproportionately benefit people of white ethnicity from wealthy backgrounds with connections and access to good education.
Another measure specified to boost labour incomes is to shift towards a system that adequately rewards workers for their services, that is, a system of “civic capitalism”, as coined by Colin Hay. Byrne alleges that one step to ensure this is to create an in-built mechanism that ensures workers’ savings are channelled into companies that adopt sustainable and labour-friendly practices. One of the ways to achieve this is to require the National Employment Savings Trust (NEST) sets up guidelines and benchmarks for social and environmental goals for the companies in which it invests. In this way, Byrne has adopted an indirect approach to workers’ welfare, as opposed to a direct approach through promoting trade unionisation among workers, which in the UK has fallen from 32.4 per cent in 1995 to 22.3 per cent in 2022 . This would enhance workers’ bargaining power to increase their wages and secure better benefits and security.
Apart from boosting workers’ wages, Byrne underscores the need to create wealth for all, ie, a wealth-owning democracy. Inspired by Michael Sherraden’s idea of “asset-based welfare” and Individual Development Accounts, Byrne proposes to create a Universal Savings Account that enables every individual to accumulate both pension and human capital. He advocates that a Universal Savings Account can be created by merging Auto-enrolment pension accounts, Lifetime Individual Savings Accounts (LISAs) and the Help to Save scheme. Re-iterating the proposals from the pioneering studies by the Institute of Fiscal Studies and the Resolution Foundation, Byrne proposes to expand the coverage of the auto-enrolment pension scheme to low-income earners, the self-employed and youth aged between 16 and 18, to increase savings rates and to reduce withdrawal limits from the pension fund.
In the last chapter, Byrne emphasises the enlargement of net household wealth relative to GDP from 435 per cent in 2000 to about 700 per cent by 2017, without any commensurate change in wealth-related taxes to GDP share. This has created a problem of unequal taxation across income groups, which, he states, must be rectified. To do this, he endorses Arun Advani, Alex Cobham and James Meade’s proposals of introducing an annual wealth tax.
Byrne attempts to encapsulate an existing range of ideas for reform pertaining to diverse domains like state-backed institutions, corporate law restructuring, social security and tax reforms.
Overall, the book presents a coherent strategy to reverse wealth disparity and build a wealth-owning democracy through a guiding principle of delivering social justice and promoting equality. The remedies for reversing wealth inequality offered in the book are not new; rather, Byrne attempts to encapsulate an existing range of ideas for reform pertaining to diverse domains like state-backed institutions, corporate law restructuring, social security and tax reforms. The pathway for the acceptance and adoption of all these reforms is no mean feat; it would entail a shift from a narrow focus on profit-maximisation towards holistic attempts to adequately reward workers for their services and improve their wellbeing.
Note: This post gives the views of the author, and not the position of the LSE Review of Books blog, or of the London School of Economics and Political Science.
Image credit: Cagkan Sayin on Shutterstock.
Vid: Mason’s deranged Corbyn smear – ‘He’s disarming Ukraine and tolerating antisemitism’
Corbyn apparently travelling the length and breadth of Europe to stop the neo-Nazi Ukrainians from ‘fighting fascism’…
Paul Mason was caught last month in a full-blown meltdown of deranged accusations, at a woman who dared to challenge Israel’s mass slaughter of innocent civilians and the unhealthy influence of pro-Israel lobby groups in British politics – and also caught misrepresenting what she had said, when a recording of her comments and his diatribe was revealed.
And he was caught on the same evening in another deranged rant, when he accused Jeremy Corbyn of ‘touring’ Europe ‘tolerating antisemitism’ and ‘disarming the Ukrainian people in their struggle against fascism’:
Audio capture by @UrbanDandyLDN, subtitles by Skwawkbox
As ‘Urban Dandy’, who recorded Mason’s ramblings, commented:
Mason’s suggestion that Jeremy Corbyn tolerates antisemitism is false, just as the widespread, mainstream claims that there was a serious antisemitism problem in Labour under Corbyn’s leadership were false, and have been debunked repeatedly. The MP for Islington North is taking legal action against Nigel Farage for similar defamatory statements, while another political commentator favoured in the mainstream media recently had to make a humiliating public apology for his baseless allegations against Corbyn.
Screengrab from X / johnmcternan
Disarming the Ukrainians
Paul Mason’s second allegation against Corbyn, that the MP has been on a European tour aimed at disarming the Ukrainian people, is also false. Corbyn has never called for the disarming of Ukraine. The anti-war veteran who fronts the Peace & Justice Project has spoken in many European cities since Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine in early 2022, mainly at events organised by peace campaigners. Corbyn has called for diplomacy instead of escalation, and expressed skepticism about the relentless arms sales by western companies.
Mason’s claim that the left wants to somehow stop Ukrainians ‘fighting fascism’ is also bizarre enough to verge on the delusional. Ukraine is well known, despite the best efforts of the UK media to rewrite history, to be rife with actual nazis, some of whom are in influential positions in the Zelenskiy regime. Zelenskiy himself has seized control of Ukraine’s media, stripped workers of their rights and shut down opposition groups, all key identifiers of fascism.
Mason’s reputation, already falling apart because of his support for Keir Starmer, was shredded in 2022 when The Grayzone revealed his emails plotting with security-state figures to take down left-wing news outlets, accompanied by a notorious, sprawling chart showing the links he imagined among left groups Russia and China – and boasting of ‘cauteris[ing] Corbyn and Stop the War’ so that ‘no MP will touch them:
Mason’s support for Starmer despite the so-called ‘Labour leader’s backing for Israel’s genocide in Gaza has left him a risible figure, yet he keeps spouting his nonsense despite the inevitable backfiring and mockery.
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Limitarianism: The Case Against Extreme Wealth – review
In the face of soaring wealth inequality, Ingrid Robeyns‘ Limitarianism: The Case Against Extreme Wealth calls for restrictions on individual fortunes. Robeyns puts forward a strong moral case for imposing wealth caps, though how to navigate the political and practical hurdles involved remains unclear, writes Stewart Lansley.
Watch a YouTube recording of an LSE event where Ingrid Robeyns spoke about the book.
Limitarianism: The Case Against Extreme Wealth. Ingrid Robeyns. Allen Lane. 2023.
Ingrid Robeyns’ Limitarianism is the latest in a long line of critiques – such as Thomas Piketty’s Capital and Branko Milanovic’s Visions of Inequality – of the soaring wealth and income gaps of recent decades. Limitarianism focuses on personal wealth, which is much more unequally distributed than incomes, and is arguably the most urgent of these trends. It draws most closely on the United States, where, according to Forbes, nine of the world’s top 15 billionaires are citizens.
Robeyns argues that given the wider damage from the enrichment of the few, with its negative impact on economic strength and on wider life chances and social resilience, we must now impose a limit on individual wealth holdings. Thinkers have been making the case for this “limitarianism” and the capping of business rewards for centuries. The Classical Greek Philosopher, Plato, argued that political stability required the richest to own no more than four times that of the poorest. The Gilded Age financier, J. P. Morgan – one of the most powerful of American plutocrats of the nineteenth century – maintained that executives should earn no more than twenty times the pay of the lowest paid worker. In 1942, President Roosevelt proposed a 100 percent top tax rate, stating that “[n]o American citizen ought to have a net income, after he has paid his taxes, of more than $25,000 a year (about $1m in today’s terms).” “The most forthright and effective way of enhancing equality within the firm would be to specify the maximum range between average and maximum compensation”, wrote the influential American economist J. K. Galbraith in 1973.
The Gilded Age financier, J. P. Morgan […] maintained that executives should earn no more than twenty times the pay of the lowest paid worker.
One of the effects of the 2008 financial crisis was to trigger a debate about the role played by excessive compensation packages in banking. Others have argued that the introduction of guaranteed minimum wages – which limits employer freedom over employees – should come with a maximum too. As wealth inequality has deepened in recent decades, there have been growing calls for measures to reduce this concentration, not least among some members of the global super-rich club. Yet there has been perilously little political action. Each year the world’s mega-rich, facing few constraints, carry on appropriating a larger share of national and global wealth pools.
Robeyns sets out a powerful moral case against today’s wealth divide and asks the all-important question: “how much is too much?”. She calls for setting limits to the size of individual fortunes that would vary across countries. In the case of the Netherlands, where she lives, “we should aim to create a society in which no one has more than €10m. There shouldn’t be any decamillionaires.” This, she argues should be politically imposed. She also adds a second aspirational goal, an appeal to a new voluntary moral code applied by individuals themselves: “I contend that … the ethical limit [on wealth] will be around 1 million pounds, dollars or euros per person.”
Although there are many critics who dismiss the philosophical concept as either unfeasible or undesirable, history suggests the idea is far from utopian. Limits operated pretty effectively among nations – including the UK and the US – in the post-war decades and became an important instrument in the move towards greater equality.
War has long proved a powerful equalising force, and the post-1945 decades brought peak egalitarianism.
War has long proved a powerful equalising force, and the post-1945 decades brought peak egalitarianism. States shifted from their pre-war pro-inequality role to become agents of equality. This brought (albeit temporary) upward pressure on the lowest incomes and downward pressure on the highest. These limits operated in two ways: through regulation and taxation, and changes in cultural norms. Nations imposed highly progressive tax systems, with especially high tax rates at the top – that were sustained in the UK until the 1980s – the expansion of protective welfare states, and a shift in bargaining power from the boardroom to the workforce.
These policies were also enabled by a significant pro-equality cultural shift. This brought a tighter check on top business rewards and the size of fortunes. Until the early 1980s, business behaviour became more restrained, and wealth gaps narrowed. The kind of business appropriation that has become so widespread today would, for the most part, have been unacceptable to public and political opinion then. Gone were the public displays of extravagance and the high living of the inter-war years. Up to the 1970s, and the return of what Edward Heath called the “unacceptable face of capitalism”, executive salaries in the UK were moderated by a kind of hidden “shame gene”, an unwritten social code – similar in some ways to Robeyns’ call for voluntary limits – which acted as a check on greed. It was a code that was largely adhered to, partly because of fear of public outrage towards excessive wealth.
Up to the 1970s, and the return of what Edward Heath called the ‘unacceptable face of capitalism’, executive salaries in the UK were moderated by a kind of hidden ‘shame gene’
Robeyns is making a conceptual case. She doesn’t give much detail of how limitarianism might work in practice, and doesn’t draw lessons from the post-war experience (though this was the product of the particular circumstances of the time). She recognises the hurdles needed to make the politics of limitarianism a reality. There are plenty of questions of detail that would need to be settled. How, as a society, would we determine the appropriate “rich lines” above which is too much? Would the “undeserving rich” whose wealth is achieved by extraction that hurts wider society, be treated differently from the ‘deserving’ who through exceptional skill, effort and risk-taking, create new wealth in ways that benefit others as well as themselves?
The expectation that the tremors of the 2008 meltdown would trigger a shift towards a more progressive governing philosophy that embraced a more equal sharing of wealth has failed to materialise.
The greatest hurdle is political. The expectation that the tremors of the 2008 meltdown would trigger a shift towards a more progressive governing philosophy that embraced a more equal sharing of wealth has failed to materialise. The pro-market, anti-state politics of recent decades are now largely discredited. International Monetary Fund staff, for example, have called neoliberal politics “oversold”. There are widespread calls for the reset of capitalism, with as Robeyns puts it, “a more considerate, values-based economic system”. Although such a system may yet emerge, there are few signs of the kind of value-shift and new cultural norms that would be a pre-condition for a politics of restraint and limitarianism.
This post gives the views of the author, and not the position of the LSE Review of Books blog, or of the London School of Economics and Political Science.
Image Credit: dvlcom on Shutterstock.
Own This! How Platform Co-operatives Help Workers Build a Democratic Internet – review
In Own This! How Platform Co-operatives Help Workers Build a Democratic Internet, Trebor Scholz presents platform co-operativism as a fairer, more sustainable alternative to the extractive capitalist model digital work. While he acknowledges the challenges of building a movement to compete with platform capitalism, Scholz persuasively argues that embracing diverse forms of co-operativism can create a more democratic digital future, writes Lola Brittain.
Own This! How Platform Co-operatives Help Workers Build a Democratic Internet. Trebor Scholz. Verso. 2023.
In the past few years, the new forms of work ushered in by the hyper-extractive business model of “platform capitalism”, have come under increased scrutiny. This has generated interest in paths of contestation and potential alternatives. One such alternative is platform co-operativism. Fusing the co-operative ownership structure, most commonly associated with the Rochdale pioneers of 1840s England, with the technology of digital platforms, platform co-ops promise to deliver a fairer and more sustainable form of digital work.
Fusing the co-operative ownership structure, most commonly associated with the Rochdale pioneers of 1840s England, with the technology of digital platforms, platform co-ops promise to deliver a fairer and more sustainable form of digital work.
The fusion was first proposed in concrete terms by Trebor Scholz in 2014. Since then, Scholz has done much to conceptualise and popularise the practice as the head of the Platform Cooperative Consortium; a digital space dedicated to supporting the establishment, growth, and conversion of platform co-ops.
Own This! How Platform Co-operatives Help Workers Build a Democratic Internet is his latest contribution. The book offers a panoramic overview of platform co-operativism and a vision for what its future might entail, drawing on case studies from Cape Town to Manhattan. It claims that platform co-ops are not a “figment of utopian imagination” but a reality that are already transforming the digital economy and that, with the right help, support and ecosystem, they can achieve a significant impact at a global scale.
The book offers a panoramic overview of platform co-operativism and a vision for what its future might entail, drawing on case studies from Cape Town to Manhattan
The book begins with an analysis of the issues faced by platform workers that will now be familiar to many: meagre wages, extreme risk, excessive surveillance, and management via algorithm. For Scholz, this is a consequence of the lack of workplace democracy that is attributable to the concentration of ownership within the hands of a few. This is not a new issue, of course, but it has been taken to the extreme by major technology corporations in the past two decades.
The solution to abject exploitation, according to Scholz, is for workers to collectively leverage platform technologies to forge democratically owned and governed businesses.
The solution to abject exploitation, according to Scholz, is for workers to collectively leverage platform technologies to forge democratically owned and governed businesses. Through analyses of many thriving real-world examples, such as Up&Go (an umbrella domestic work co-operative) and the Drivers Co-operative (a ride-hailing co-operative), he demonstrates that worker-ownership offers more equitable value distribution, higher pay, increased algorithmic transparency and security, a greater sense of dignity and improved wellbeing.
The potential of platform co-operativism to deliver improved outcomes for workers is contrasted to alternative attempts to elicit change, specifically by “compelling” major technology corporations to do better. He argues that several of the largest players have actively sought to prevent pro-worker legislation and that they are unwilling to democratise the workplace or improve conditions.
This is of course true in some cases. But there are examples where platform companies have been forced and/or persuaded to alter their practices, through direct worker action, community pressure and action-research. Scholz discusses prospects for worker action in chapter five. Here, he argues that even “successful strikes” do not necessarily generate workplace power and control and that, in turn, unions should embrace co-operativism as an alternative mode of platform worker organisation.
This is a pertinent suggestion, especially considering the recent ruling by the UK Supreme Court that Deliveroo workers cannot be recognised as employees or represented by trade unions in collective bargaining. But, of course, starting a co-operative is not possible for all, and Scholz acknowledges that platform co-operatives should not be expected to out-compete the major platform companies. To that extent, change – as he has noted elsewhere – will require a combination of strategies.
Starting a co-operative is not possible for all, and Scholz acknowledges that platform co-operatives should not be expected to out-compete the major platform companies. To that extent, change […] will require a combination of strategies.
The book is not solely focused on platform worker co-operatives, though. Conceptualising platform co-operativism as the Swiss army knife of organisational models, Scholz touches on an array of different forms, from producer co-ops to multi-stakeholder co-ops and data co-ops. This is all to say, that platform co-operatives are far from a “homogenous force”; they come in a variety of shapes and sizes and produce a variety of benefits, not simply for workers but for communities and consumers too.
Chapter three, in which Scholz tackles the perceived challenges of size (or, indeed scalability), is particularly interesting. Here, he confronts both a critique of platform co-operativism and an ongoing debate within the movement. The critique is that platform co-operatives are unlikely to scale. The debate is whether they should even attempt to; is scale simply growth in new clothes? He claims not, arguing that co-operative scaling is about securing “the best possible overall outcome/return”. This can be achieved by scaling “up” via the expansion of the size of the operation; but also “out” through the replication of a model in different geographic location; and “deep” by nurturing the existing organisation to create added value for stakeholders. This nuanced three-dimensional framework is an appreciated intervention in debate that often tends to focus, narrowly, on size alone.
More generally, it speaks to his broader strategy for the growth of the platform co-operative movement, which can be summarised, simply, as pragmatism. He is clear, at several points within the book, that his intention is to expand the movement and attract as many “allies” as possible. This means creating ample space for different approaches and experiments. It also means rejecting ideological fixity. In chapter seven – a letter set in the year 2035, written in the tradition of social speculative fiction – he rejects James Muldoon’s association of platform co-operativism with socialism, arguing that the movement must remain a “big tent” under which many political philosophies can exist.
Not only does Own This! advocate for a collective appropriation of platforms themselves; it also seeks to wrestle ownership of the imaginaries surrounding the development of the platform economy out of the hands of major corporations.
Thus, while he is pragmatic in his approach, his vision is incredibly ambitious in scope. He imagines a near-future, twelve years from now, in which an international network of co-operatives, containing socialists, anarchists, disgruntled VC (Venture Capitalist) bros and everything in-between, is thriving. In Scholz’s vision, this network is being actively promoted and supported by 80 governments around the world, as a pivotal pillar of the response to climate change and poverty elimination. In this respect, not only does Own This! advocate for a collective appropriation of platforms themselves; it also seeks to wrestle ownership of the imaginaries surrounding the development of the platform economy out of the hands of major corporations.
Is the network that Scholz envisions possible? There are certainly many green shoots. But, as an “unfinished story of co-operative principles in the digital economy,” the book shows that there are many questions that the movement is yet to confront. This includes the ways in which regulation could be designed to support platforms co-operatives, and how democratic governance can be managed and maintained if platform co-operatives do scale.
Overall, though, the book is a critical documentation of an evolving and genuinely impactful movement. Weaving multiple real-world examples through analyses of key topics – not simply scale and union relations, but also value and prospects for data democratisation – it succeeds in vividly bringing the concept to life, whilst identifying paths for future research. As such, it will no doubt serve as a call to action for those interested in constructing an alternative digital future.
This post gives the views of the author, and not the position of the LSE Review of Books blog, or of the London School of Economics and Political Science.
Image Credit: Roman Samborskyi on Shutterstock.
Hijacked: How Neoliberalism Turned The Work Ethic Against Workers and How Workers Can Take It Back – review
In Hijacked: How Neoliberalism Turned The Work Ethic Against Workers and How Workers Can Take It Back, Elizabeth Anderson argues that neoliberalism has perverted the Protestant work ethic to exploit workers and enrich the one per cent. Magdalene D’Silva finds the book a compelling call to renew a progressive, socially democratic work ethic that promotes dignity for workers.
Hijacked: How Neoliberalism Turned The Work Ethic Against Workers and How Workers Can Take It Back. Elizabeth Anderson. Cambridge University Press. 2023.
Find this book: 
Elizabeth Anderson’s excellent 2023 book Hijacked was published the same month Australian multi-millionaire Tim Gurner said:
“Unemployment has to jump … we need to see pain … Employees feel the employer is extremely lucky to have them … We’ve gotta kill that attitude…”
America’s Senator Bernie Sanders rebuked Gurner’s diatribe as “disgusting. It’s hard to believe that you have that kind of mentality among the ruling class in the year 2023.”
Ironically, Gurner’s comments favouring employees’ objectification and employer coercive control show just what Hijacked says is: [T]he ascendance of the conservative work ethic… (which) tells workers … they owe their employers relentless toil and unquestioning obedience under whatever harsh conditions their employer chooses …”(xii).
Indeed, “neoliberalism is the descendant of this harsh version of the work ethic … [i]t entrenches the commodification of labor … people have no alternative but to submit to the arbitrary government of employers to survive.” (xii).
Anderson defines neoliberalism as an ideology favouring market orderings over state regulation […] to maximise the wealth and power of capital relative to labour
Anderson defines neoliberalism as an ideology favouring market orderings over state regulation (xii) to maximise the wealth and power of capital relative to labour (272) where the so-called “de-regulation” of labour and other markets doesn’t liberate ordinary people from the state; it transfers state regulatory authority to the most powerful, dominant firms in each market (xii).
Hijacked follows Anderson’s prior writing on neoliberalism’s replacement of democratically elected public government by the state, with unelected private government by employers. Like other work ethic critiques, Hijacked explains how Puritan theologians behind the work ethic dismissed feelings with contempt for emotional styles of faith worship (3).
Hijacked explains how Puritan theologians behind the work ethic dismissed feelings with contempt for emotional styles of faith worship
The original work ethic proselytised utilitarianism (19) but with inherent contradictions between progressive and conservative ideals (14). Early conservative work ethic advocates included Joseph Priestley, Jeremy Bentham, Thomas Malthus and Edmund Burke (Chapters 2 and 3) who aligned with the new capitalist, manager entrepreneur classes and “lazy landlords, speculators and predatory capitalists” (65) who claimed they exemplified the work ethic (127).
The work ethic split into conservative and progressive versions which Anderson distinguishes by class-based power relations, rather than competitive markets
The work ethic split into conservative and progressive versions which Anderson distinguishes by class-based power relations, rather than competitive markets, as conservatives “favour government by and for property owners, assign different duties to employers and employees, rich and poor” (while expecting) “workers to submit to despotic employer authority” (and) “regard poverty as a sign of bad character … poor workers as morally inferior” (xv).
Progressives like Adam Smith (130-135) supported “democracy and worker self-government. They oppose class-based duties … and reject stigmatization of poverty” (xvi). Anderson traces this “progressive” work ethic to classical liberals like John Locke (Chapter 2), Adam Smith (132-135), John Stuart Mill (Chapter 6) and progressive, socialist thinkers like Karl Marx (Chapter 7) who stressed how paid work should not alienate workers “from their essence or species-being…” (209) but express their individuality, as “[t]he distinctively human essence is to freely shape oneself…” (209).
Marx applied Mill’s emphasis on the importance of individuality, which Anderson links to the Puritan idea that our vocation must match our individual talents and interests (206) whatever our economic class.
Furthermore, Locke “condemned the idle predatory rich as well as able-bodied beggars” (65). Marx applied Mill’s emphasis on the importance of individuality, which Anderson links to the Puritan idea that our vocation must match our individual talents and interests (206) whatever our economic class.
Yet our worthiness now had to be proved (to God) by ‘work’ that entailed: disciplining drudgery (9), slavery (10, 259), racism (97-99), exploitative maltreatment of poor people (106) and industrious productivity (52) which became conspicuously competitive, luxury consumption (170).
Conservatives (Chapters 3, 4) secularised these ideas so the “upper-class targets of the Puritan critique hijacked the work ethic … into an instrument of class warfare against workers. Now only workers were held to its demands … the busy schemers who … extract value from others cast themselves as heroes of the work ethic, the poor as the only scoundrels” (65).
Anderson doesn’t idolise Locke, Smith, J. S. Mill and other early progressive work ethic advocates like Ricardo (Chapter 5) by highlighting harsh contradictions in their views. For example, within Locke’s pro-worker agenda were draconian measures for poor children (61) such that Anderson says Locke’s harsh policies for those he called the idle poor, contain “the seeds of the ultimate hijacking of the work ethic by capital owners” (25).
[Anderson’s] scrutiny of both left and right-wing support of the neoliberal conservative work ethic complements other critiques of the left-wing origins of neoliberal markets.
Anderson criticises the perversion and reversal of the work ethic’s originally progressive, classical liberal aspirations “and successor traditions on the left” (xviii). Her scrutiny of both left and right-wing support of the neoliberal conservative work ethic complements other critiques of the left-wing origins of neoliberal markets. Anderson also says the conservative work ethic arose in a period of rapidly rising productivity and stagnant wages, “when market discipline was reserved for workers, not the rich” (108).
Yet it was the progressive work ethic that culminated in social democracy throughout Western Europe by promoting the “freedom, dignity and welfare of each” (242). Marx was so influenced by the progressive work ethic espoused by classical liberals, his most developed work on economic theory apparently quotes Adam Smith copiously and admiringly (226). Anderson thus contends that criticism of social democracy as a radical break from classical liberalism – is a myth, as ideas like social insurance “developed within the classical liberal tradition” (227).
However, “Cold War ideology represented social democracy as … a slippery slope to totalitarianism … the title of Friederich Hayek’s … Road to Serfdom, says it all” (226).
Social democracy declined worldwide in the 1970s and 1980s when neoliberalism arose and the conservative work ethic returned with the elections of Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher
Social democracy declined worldwide in the 1970s and 1980s when neoliberalism arose and the conservative work ethic returned with the elections of Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher (Chapter 9). Social democratic centre-left parties like the US Democrats and the UK’s Labour Party (293) didn’t counter neoliberalism’s conservative work ethic, as “the demographics of these parties shifted… from the working class to the professional managerial class” (257), seduced by meritocracy ideology in a competitive race for (their own) superior status (257). Anderson’s observation complements Elizabeth Humphry’s research on how Australia’s Labor Party and labour union movement introduced vanguard neoliberalism to Australia against workers, in the 1980s.
[Anderson] argues the focus on efficiency and aggregate growth neglected workers’ conditions and plight as neoliberal work (for welfare) policies degrade people’s autonomy and capabilities
Anderson recognises the success of some neoliberal policies in the US’s economic stagnation in the 1970s, like trucking deregulation, emissions reduction trade schemes and international trade liberalisation (285-287). However, she argues the focus on efficiency and aggregate growth neglected workers’ conditions and plight as neoliberal work (for welfare) policies degrade people’s autonomy and capabilities because “the most important product of our economic system is ourselves” (288).
Hijacked’s last chapter recommends social democracy renewal and updating the progressive work ethic “to ensure … every person … has the resources and opportunities to develop … their talents … engage with others on terms of trust, sympathy and genuine cooperation” (298). Employees could be empowered through worker cooperatives (297).
A gap in Hijacked’s analysis is a lack of clear definition of “work.” Anderson doesn’t distinguish between “employment” in a “job,” and rich elites’ voluntary, symbolic “duties,” like those of Britain’s “working royals” who call their activities “work”.
Another dilemma is whether economic class power struggles can change peacefully, noting Peter Turchin says we’re facing ‘end times’ of war and political disintegration because competing elites won’t relinquish power.
Nevertheless, Hijacked is compelling reading for everyone on the left and the right who needs employment in a paid job to survive, so today’s neoliberal conservative work ethic no longer gaslights us to believe our dignity demands our exploitation.
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