billionaires

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As Gaza burns, Labour organises ‘Keir-aoke’ to raise party funds

Starmer’s party isn’t satisfied with making us cringe through billionaire donations, support for war crimes and contempt for Palestinian suffering

With more than 20,000 slaughtered in Gaza by Israel – around half of them children – and many more maimed, Keir Starmer is rightly facing jeers and heckling everywhere he goes, because of his support for Israel’s ‘right’ to ‘defend itself’ by the mass murder of civilians and the razing of schools, hospitals and homes.

Labour’s response? A fundraiser titled ‘Keir-aoke’ – not to raise funds for oppressed Palestinians facing an illegal occupation and an apartheid system that treats them as lower than animals, but for whatever purposes the party thinks fit:

Despite donations from billionaires and corporations, Labour is still telling its members that it depends on their donations to survive – but clearly the regime’s numerous begging letters aren’t getting a good response and the party machine is somehow deluded enough to think mutilating language to name an event after Starmer is going to be more, not less appealing.

The lowest price for a ticket to this cringe-fest is £16.96 (but only for ‘concessions’), though people can save money by not going and instead buying – seriously – a ‘solidarity’ ticket for a mere £15:

Labour has already had to cancel one event because of protests by human rights supporters outraged by Starmer’s and local MP Steve Reed’s enthusiastic support for genocide, but the party is clearly not inclined to think, let alone learn, and its delusion runs deep.

Meanwhile, people with actual human feeling will be marching in their hundreds of thousands, in London and around the country, for justice, a ceasefire and an end to the illegal occupation of Palestine:

Check here for the actions near you – but be aware that at the time of writing, the PSC event page appears to be under an attack that is suspiciously affecting only that page on the PSC’s website.

If you wish to republish this post for non-commercial use, you are welcome to do so – see here for more.

Stocking Up on Wealth … Concentration

Published by Anonymous (not verified) on Fri, 24/11/2023 - 12:09am in

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There’s an old joke that economics is too important to be left to economists. In the same vein, I think rich people are too important to be left to the self-help industry.

Yes, the popular appeal of you-can-get-rich-too books is obvious. But what’s not obvious is why so few social scientists study wealth.1 Clearly, the public thirsts for serious inquiries about the rich. (Thomas Piketty’s opus on inequality was a bestseller.) But for the most part, social scientists are content to focus on ‘poverty’ and let the self-help gurus wax about ‘wealth’.

The irony, in my view, is that poverty and wealth are two sides of the same coin. Concentrated wealth begets concentrated poverty. Still, there is an asymmetry between the two extremes. As a rule, poor people have little power, which means they cannot be blamed for their own poverty. But almost by definition, the rich wield power to their own benefit, which means they create the conditions of their own opulence … and everyone else’s misery.

Given their power over society, I find myself on a research kick studying rich people. (Earlier entries: a, b, c, and d.) This post concludes the binge with a look at what drives wealth concentration among the richest Americans. I find that there’s a straight line between wealth concentration, corporate consolidation, and the strategy of ‘buying, not building’. In short, Peter Thiel is correct when he says that ‘competition is for losers’.

A neoliberal experiment

Speaking of competition and losers, Ronald Reagan set the tone of the neoliberal era when, in 1981, he fired 11,000 striking air-traffic controllers. The message? Workers were losers who would be subjected to the discipline of competition. Reagan called it ‘morning in America’. But really, it was ‘morning for American big business’.

Today, we are well into the next-day’s hangover, and we know how the party played out. For workers, it was a disaster. But for the rich, it was an incredible boon. Wealth didn’t trickle down so much as it got catapulted up. The result, as Figure 1A shows, was a relentless rise in the concentration of American wealth.

Figure 1: A neoliberal experiment — rising wealth concentration among Americans, and American elites. The top panel shows the Gini index of wealth concentration among all Americans. The bottom panel shows the concentration of wealth among the 400 richest Americans. [Sources and methods]

Interestingly, as wealth got catapulted from the poor to the rich, it also got transported from the mega rich to the supremely rich. This is the story told by Figure 1B. Here, I’ve focused on the richest Americans — the folks who grace the Forbes 400 list. Even here, among the upper crust of elites, wealth has grown more concentrated. Why?

As you’ll see, the culprit seems to be the stock market. But before we interrogate our suspect, let’s have a quick look at the brethren of the American rich — the globetrotting, jet-fuel belching species otherwise known as Earth’s billionaires.

A billionaire hammer

They say that when you’ve got a hammer, everything looks like a nail. Well, lately my hammer has been data from Forbes. Which means that I can’t seem to write a post without pounding on the world’s billionaires. (Luckily, they deserve it.)

Backing up a bit, the reason I’m holding a Forbes hammer is that since late 2021, I’ve been scraping Forbes’ global billionaire data. The endeavor started with an email from my colleague DT Cochrane, who pointed out the value of having a daily snapshot of billionaires’ wealth. I concurred, and set some billionaire-scraping code in motion. The result is that today, I have just over two years worth of daily data about the wealth of the world’s billionaires.

Billionaires.

The word itself evokes a kind of class coherence. But the reality is that billionaires are a deceptively unequal group. For example, the world’s billionaires have a median wealth of about $2.4 billion. And to most people, that seems like a tremendous fortune. But compared to the $240B wealth of the world’s richest man, Elon Musk, $2.4B is chump change. Heck, Musk spent 16 times more than that just to buy a social-media company and set it in fire.

The message is that billionaire wealth is both spectacularly large and spectacularly concentrated. And as it turns out, this concentration varies with a coherent pattern. Figure 2 shows the picture over the last two years. Something is driving billionaire wealth concentration up and down. What could it be?

Figure 2: Wealth concentration among the world’s billionaires. The blue curve shows the Gini index of wealth concentration among the world’s billionaires, measured daily since late 2021. Data is from the Forbes real-time billionaires list. [Sources and methods]

The stock market confesses

The physicist Richard Feynman claimed to dislike reading scientific papers because, as his biographer James Gleick put it, “every arriving paper was like a detective novel with the last chapter printed first.”2 The format, Feynman complained, spoiled the fun of doing detective work.

With apologies to detectives like Feynman, I’m about to spoil the fun. When it comes to wealth concentration among billionaires, the main driver appears to be the stock market.

To be fair, the culprit was fairly obvious. Almost without exception, the richest individuals have their fortunes invested in corporate property rights — rights which are traded on the stock market.3 So if we want to understand inequality in these investments, the stock market is the primary suspect. Still, you might be surprised by the detail of its testimony.

In Figure 3, I bring the stock market in for questioning. ‘What drives billionaire wealth concentration?’ I ask. The stock market squeals, ‘I do! I do!’

Figure 3: The stock market confesses — billionaire wealth concentration moves with the S&P 500. The blue curve shows the Gini index of wealth inequality among the world’s billionaires. The red curve shows the movement of the S&P 500 — a popular index of US corporate stocks. [Sources and methods]

A longer track record

Looking at the confession in Figure 3, the detective in me worries that it’s too good to be true. Seriously, the fit between the S&P 500 and billionaire wealth concentration is so tight that it makes me fret that I’ve flubbed the analysis. Fortunately, our suspect has given other confessions.

Turning to the United States, we find a similar connection between elite wealth concentration and the movement of the stock market. Figure 4 shows the record. The blue curve plots the level of wealth concentration among the Forbes 400. The red curve plots the rise of the S&P 500, measured relative to US GDP per capita. Again, it’s a compelling testimony. Elite wealth concentration seems to be driven by the stock market.

Figure 4: A longer track record — the S&P 500 predicts changes in wealth concentration among the Forbes 400. The blue curve plots the Gini index of wealth concentration among the Forbes 400. The red curve plots the rise of the S&P 500, measured relative to US nominal GDP per capita. [Sources and methods]

Within the confession, a (math) puzzle

It this point, it’s tempting to close the case. When questioned about elite wealth concentration, the stock market confessed to the crime. And yet, if we think more deeply about the testimony, we find that it comes with a puzzle.

The mystery starts when we realize that the stock market is not one thing. It is many things — many corporate stocks that each have a mind of their own. Now, when we look at the S&P 500, we’re measuring the average movement of these stocks. Fine. But the thing about averages is that they typically tell us nothing about measures of spread. Yet elite wealth concentration is definitely a measure of spread.

And so we have a mathematical puzzle. The stock-market average seems to ‘know’ about something that it shouldn’t. Why?

Growth through inequality

To unwrap our stock-market puzzle, we need to review some math. In general, measures of spread are unrelated to measures of central tendency.4 There is, however, an exception. It happens when growth is driven by inequality.

To illustrate this exception, we’ll turn to a simple thought experiment. Imagine two people, Alice and Bob, who both have $1 in their pocket. Over time, we hand out money to the pair, thereby increasing their pool of wealth. But the catch is that we give the money exclusively to Bob.

Table 1 shows how these handouts affect Alice and Bob’s average wealth, along with their wealth concentration. As we hand money to Bob, Alice and Bob’s average wealth grows. But this average is driven not by shared prosperity, but by rising inequality. Importantly, in this situation of one-sided handouts, the wealth average becomes an (unwitting) indicator of the level of wealth spread.

Table 1: Growth through inequality

Year
Alice’s wealth
Bob’s wealth
Average wealth
Wealth concentration (Gini index)

1
$1
$1
$1
0.00

2
$1
$3
$2
0.50

3
$1
$9
$5
0.80

Note: To measure wealth concentration, I’ve used the sample-size adjusted Gini index. For details, see this paper by George Deltas.

Putting on our detective hats, it seems likely that similar behavior — what I’m calling ‘growth through inequality’ — explains our stock-market results. We’ve found that the S&P 500 index (an average) is connected to levels of elite wealth concentration (a form of spread). But this connection only makes sense if the S&P 500 is an (unwitting) indicator of stock-market inequality.

So with inequality in mind, we need to peer inside the S&P 500 to see how it gets made.

Inside the S&P 500

I realize that studying the plumbing of a stock index makes for less-than-captivating reading. So let me cut to the chase: in simple terms, the S&P 500 tracks the total market capitalization of the 500 largest US firms.

For the math averse, you can take this fact and skip to Figure 5. But for the equation lovers, here are the details.

The S&P 500 tracks the average stock price of five hundred of the largest US companies.5 Importantly, S&P weights the average according to each company’s size, measured in terms of outstanding shares.

Here’s the math. Let P_i be the stock price of company i . And let Q_i be the number of outstanding shares in this company. Summing over all 500 companies, the S&P 500 is then:

\displaystyle \text{SP500} \propto \sum_i P_i \times Q_i

Importantly, when we multiply stock price P by the number of shares Q , we are calculating a company’s market capitalization, K . So in simplified terms, the S&P 500 sums the market capitalization of the 500 largest US firms:

\displaystyle \text{SP500} \propto \sum_i K_i

Backtracking slightly, note that I’ve used the ‘ \propto ’ symbol (which stands for ‘proportional to’) in the formulas above. I’ve used it because I’m excluding some adjustments that go into calculating the actual S&P 500 index. Since these adjustments don’t affect my argument, I’m going to ignore them.6

Forging ahead, our equations indicate that the S&P 500 is proportional to the total market capitalization of the 500 largest US companies. On that front, the empirical evidence suggests the same thing, as shown in Figure 5.7

Figure 5: The S&P 500 is an adjusted index of market capitalization. The blue curve shows the S&P 500. The red curve plots the total market capitalization of the 500 largest publicly-traded US firms, ranked by market cap. To a first approximation, the two curves are identical, meaning the S&P 500 is an adjusted index of capitalization. [Sources and methods]

The reason I’m bothering with this stock-index math is that I want to look at the components of the S&P 500. We now understand that these components are basically the market capitalization of the 500 largest US firms. Let’s use this knowledge to peer inside the S&P sausage.

Figure 6 shows a different view of the S&P 500. Rather than summing the market capitalization of our top 500 firms, I’ve plotted the market-cap values for each firm. Then I’ve connected the values with a pretty rainbow that shows the evolving composition of the S&P 500 index. Besides being nice eye candy, this market-cap rainbow (presumably) holds the key to understanding why the S&P 500 relates to elite wealth concentration.

Figure 6: Inside the S&P 500. This figure shows the (approximate) components of the S&P 500 — the market capitalization of the 500 largest US corporations. Each colored line tracks a specific capitalization rank (not a specific corporation). Note that the vertical axis uses a log scale. [Sources and methods]

Growth through corporate concentration

Having dissected the S&P 500, we’re ready to return to our original question: why does a stock-market average tells us about a measure of elite wealth spread? The answer, it turns out, is that what appears as stock-market ‘growth’ is in part, an artifact of rising stock-market concentration.

Here’s how it works. Returning to our Alice-and-Bob thought experiment, we were able to increase Alice and Bob’s average wealth by handing money solely to Bob. But this rising average didn’t indicate shared prosperity. It was an artifact of the rich getting richer.

Turning to the stock market, the situation is similar. Except that Alice and Bob are not people, they are firms. The Bob-like firms are giant companies like Apple, Microsoft, Google and Amazon — four corporations that have a combined market capitalization of about $5.9 trillion. The Alice-like firms are the smaller companies on the S&P 500.

What’s important is that collectively, our four Bob-like firms account for about a sixth of the value of the entire S&P 500. So if their stock rises, it will buoy the whole S&P 500 index. But this buoyancy isn’t really ‘growth’; it’s an artifact of corporate concentration — rich firms getting richer.

In more general terms, when we look at the rise of the S&P 500 index, we find that it is connected to levels of corporate concentration. Figure 7 makes the case. In Figure 7A, I’ve plotted a measure of corporate concentration — the Gini index of market capitalization among the 500 largest US firms. When this Gini index grows, it signals that corporate wealth is being concentrated in the hands of the richest firms. Looking at Figure 7B, we see that this corporate concentration is tied to the movement of the S&P 500 (measured relative to US GDP per capita).

Figure 7: Stock-market growth through inequality. Panel A plots the level of wealth concentration among the 500 largest publicly trade US firms — the Gini index of market capitalization. Panel B shows the movement of the S&P 500 relative to US nominal GDP per capita. The correlation between the two curves (R2 = 0.42) suggest that the movement of the S&P 500 is driven in part by market concentration — rich firms getting richer. [Sources and methods]

So in Figure 7, we’ve got evidence that the S&P 500 is an unwitting indicator of US corporate concentration. And it’s not because S&P analysts tried to make that happen. (They didn’t.) It’s because historically, an important part of (apparent) stock-market growth is simply the richest firms getting richer.

To the owners go the spoils

So what happens as rich firms get richer? Well, the rich owners of these firms also get richer.

Today, for example, the richest firms are companies like Amazon, Google and Microsoft. Unsurprisingly, the individuals who own these firms — Jeff Bezos, Larry Page, Bill Gates and Sergey Brin — are consistently among the world’s richest people. Bringing dynamics into the fold, as these big-tech companies consolidate their holdings, we expect that this consolidation will concentrate wealth in the hands of big-tech owners. In other words, the concentration of corporate wealth should beget the concentration of individual wealth.

So does it? At least in the United States, the answers seems to be yes. Figure 8 makes the case. Looking at the richest firms and the richest individuals, we find that the concentration of corporate wealth (horizontal axis) strongly predicts the concentration of individual wealth (vertical axis). To the richest owners go the spoils of oligopoly.

Figure 8: The concentration of corporate wealth begets the concentration of individual wealth. The horizontal axis plots a measure of corporate consolidation — the Gini index of market-cap concentration among the 500 largest publicly-traded US firms. The vertical axis plots a measure individual wealth concentration — the wealth Gini index among the Forbes 400. Evidently elite inequality has been driven in large part by corporate consolidation. [Sources and methods]

Concentration through acquisition

At this point we’ve got some fairly incendiary evidence. The ‘crime’ of elite wealth concentration seems to be tied directly to corporate oligarchy. But before we put the case to rest, let’s consider the testimony of the defense’s expert witnesses. I’m talking, of course, about neoclassical economists.

Ostensibly, neoclassical economists love competitive markets and hate monopoly. But beginning in the 1980s, a weird thing happened; economists at the University of Chicago started to argue that despite lacking competition, monopolies could still be ‘efficient’. Their reasoning was that if monopolists actually behaved badly, they would be undercut by competitors, and their monopoly would be undone. Therefore, if a monopoly exists, it must be because the monopolist is doing what the market wants.

Now the logic here is torturous. We’re positing imaginary competition to justify a lack of real-world competition. But then again, neoclassical economists have never let the real world get in the way of their imaginations. And in this case, the goal of the imaginary theorizing was always obvious: it was designed get government out of the way and allow big corporations to purchase their way to power.

Backing up a bit, politicians are rarely incensed when a big corporation builds more factories. So in that sense, the government is not opposed to big companies getting bigger. But from a corporate vantage point, factory building is a less-than-ideal route to bigness. The problem is simple: if everyone builds more factories, it leads to ‘free run of production’ (Thorstein Veblen’s term) which then collapses profits. So savvy corporations are always looking for a better route to power. And that better route is to buy instead of build.

The buy-not-build tactic is hardly rocket science. As Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler observe, when you buy your competitor, you solve two problems at once: you accumulate power and reduce your competition. The difficulty, though, is that this buy-not-build tactic has the appearance of being a blatant power grab. So there’s the risk that an entrepreneurial government might get in the way.

That’s where Chicago-school theorists come in. Starting in the 1980s, they successfully preached an ideology that got the government out of the way. The net result is the modern corporate landscape, forged in large part by a string of government-approved corporate acquisitions.

Tech monopolist Google has been a prime benefactor of this buy-not-build tactic. As Cory Doctorow notes, “Google didn’t invent its way to glory — it bought its way there.” He continues:

Google’s success stories (its ad-tech stack, its mobile platform, its collaborative office suite, its server-management tech, its video platform …) are all acquisitions.

The same strategy holds for most of today’s corporate oligarchies. Their tentacles have largely been bought, not built. On this front, the numbers don’t lie: the consolidated corporate landscape of the 21st century was forged by a massive, neoliberal wave of mergers and acquisitions

Let’s have a look at the tsunami.

To quantify the scale of mergers and acquisitions, we’ll turn to an index called the buy-to-build ratio. As the name suggests, the buy-to-build ratio measures the corporate proclivity for buying other companies instead of building new capacity. Created by Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler (and first published in 2001), the buy-to-build ratio takes the value of corporate mergers and acquisitions and divides them by the value of greenfield investments. The greater this buy-to-build ratio, the more that corporations are buying (and not building) their way to power.

As I’ve alluded, the neoliberal era saw a massive wave of corporate mergers and acquisitions. As a result, from 1980 to 2000, the US buy-to-build ratio jumped nearly tenfold. And guess what accompanied this acquisition wave. That’s right … a sharp rise in corporate concentration.

Figure 9 shows the connection. As the US buy-to-build ratio increased (horizontal axis), so did the market-cap concentration among the largest US firms (vertical axis). The lesson is clear: over the last forty years, big corporations have been buying their way to consolidated power.

Figure 9: US corporate concentration has been fueled by mergers and acquisitions. This figure compares the market-cap concentration of the 500 largest US firms (vertical axis) to the US buy-to-build ratio (horizontal axis). The buy-to-build ratio measures the value of corporate mergers and acquisitions relative to greenfield investments. (I’ve used buy-to-build estimates from Joseph Francis.) The correlation shown here suggests that the neoliberal wave of corporate concentration was fueled by a corporate buying spree. [Sources and methods]

Competition is for losers

One of the (few) nice things about living in an era of concentrated corporate power is that modern plutocrats are brash enough to speak plainly about their ambitions. Forget the arcane language wielded by Chicago-school economists. Today’s plutes — men like Peter Thiel — say the quiet part out loud. If you want to ‘capture lasting value’, Thiel proclaims, ‘look to build a monopoly’. Or in mantra form, ‘competition is for losers’.

John D. Rockefeller would be proud.

Speaking of Rockefeller, did you know that he was one of the principle funders of the University of Chicago? Ironic, isn’t it. Rockefeller, like Thiel, spoke openly about his pursuit of power and personal enrichment. So if, during Rockefeller’s life, someone had connected elite wealth concentration to corporate consolidation, the reaction would have been “Well, that’s obvious.”

Fast forward to the 1980s and the connection became not-so obvious, at least to economists. And that’s thanks in large part to Rockefeller’s Chicago-school investment, which pumped out decades worth of pro-oligarch propaganda.

Today, we’ve come full circle. Billionaires like Peter Thiel are so hubristic that they speak brazenly about their pursuit of power, laying bare their inner robber baron. The upshot to this plute bravado is that few people will be surprised by the straight line that connects corporate oligarchy with the concentration of elite wealth.

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Sources and Methods

US distribution of wealth

In Figure 1, I calculated the US wealth Gini index using data from the World Inequality Database. Income threshold data is from series thwealj992. Income share data is from series shwealj992.

Forbes data

I scraped historic Forbes 400 data from many corners of the internet. You can find notes about the specific sources here.

Data for global billionaire wealth is from the Forbes real-time billionaire list. I’ve been keeping a daily archive of the list since October 2021.

S&P 500

Data for the S&P 500 is from two sources. For Figure 3, I downloaded the daily data using the R package tidyquant, series ^GSPC. The long-term S&P 500 data plotted in Figure 4 is from Robert Shiller, available here.

US nominal GDP per capita

Data for US nominal GDP is from:

  • 1983–2021: Bureau of Economic Analysis, Table 1.1.5
  • 2021–2023: quarterly GDP per capita data from FRED, series A939RC0Q052SBEA.

Data for US population is from:

Market capitalization

Data for the market cap of the largest US companies (Figure 5) is from Compustat. To calculate each company’s market cap, I took the number of shares outstanding (series csho) and multiplied it by the annual closing share price (series prcc_c).

Buy-to-build ratio

The buy-to-build ratio is calculated by taking the value of corporate mergers and acquisitions and dividing it by the value of gross fixed capital formation (which is a rough measurement of ‘greenfield’ investment).

Compiling the requisite historical data for this calculation is no small task. The main hurdle, as Jonathan Nitzan notes, is that “there are no systematic historical time series for mergers and acquisitions”. So any estimate must piece together a hodgepodge of different sources.

In this post, I’ve used Joseph Francis’ 2013 estimates for the US buy-to-build ratio. You can download his data here, and read his methods here. It’s also worth reading Bichler and Nitzan’s comments on Francis’ calculation, which are available here.

Speaking of wealth and poverty

Still reading? Here’s a little reward for getting to the end of the article — a piece of research that I couldn’t fit in the main text. It turns out that social scientists (at least those who write in English) haven’t always prioritized studying ‘poverty’ over ‘wealth’. Figure 10 makes the case using data from the Google English corpus.

Two centuries ago, the phrase ‘cause of wealth’ was just as popular as the phrase ‘cause of poverty’. And that makes sense. In 1776, Adam Smith published his famous tome about the wealth of nations. Clearly, he and other political economists wanted to understand wealth. But throughout the 19th century, interest in wealth waned, leading to today’s dichotomy. Judging by word count, about ten times as many people study the ‘cause of poverty’ as study the ‘cause of wealth’.

Figure 10: From wealth to poverty. Apparently, social scientists have not always prioritized the study of poverty over the study of wealth. Judging by word frequency from the Google English corpus, 18th century English writers were quite interested in the ‘cause of wealth’ — at least as interested as they were in the ‘cause of poverty’. But over the 19th century, the study of wealth fell out of favor, leading to today’s dichotomy. Studying the ‘cause of wealth’ is now about ten times less popular than studying the ‘cause of poverty’. [Notes: I downloaded Google ngram data using the excellent R package ngramr.]

Notes

  1. Blogroll shoutout: if you’re interested in the nuts and bolts of wealth accounting, check out Steve Roth’s blog Wealth Economics.↩
  2. Commenting on Feynman’s distaste for the way scientific papers are organized, James Gleick writes:

    … [Feynman] could not bear to sit down with the journals or preprints that arrived daily on his desk and piled up on his shelves and merely read them. Every arriving paper was like a detective novel with the last chapter printed first. He wanted to read just enough to understand the problem; then he wanted to solve it his own way.

    ↩

  3. True, some billionaires own private companies, so their investments are not traded on the stock market. But even then, Forbes looks to the stock market to capitalize the value of private property. (To guess the value of private businesses, Forbes takes their profit/sales and capitalizes it using the average discount rate found in the market.)↩
  4. To be more technical, measures of central tendency are typically unrelated to scale-independent measures of spread. For example, the standard deviation is a common, scale-dependent measure of spread which is related to the mean. But the coefficient of variation (the standard deviation divided by the mean) is not related to central tendency because it is scale independent.

    The Gini index is a good example of a scale-independent measure of spread. If you multiply everyone’s wealth by a constant factor, it won’t affect the Gini index. This is by design. But for what it’s worth, some people think this design feature is a bug. For example, anthropologist Jason Hickel argues that we should use measures of inequality that are sensitive to absolute differences in income/wealth. I disagree, for reasons spelled out here.↩

  5. Interestingly, the selection of S&P 500 companies isn’t done simply by ranking market cap and taking the top 500 companies. Instead, S&P has a committee (whose membership is kept secret) that makes arbitrary changes to the list, swapping firms at their discretion. So why the committee approach? Obviously because it makes S&P brass feel important, and justifies their (presumably) fat pay checks.↩
  6. There are two major adjustments that go into making the S&P 500 index. First, changes in the index composition are not allowed to affect the index itself. So if Company A gets added to the S&P 500 and Company B gets removed, the swap can’t change the resulting index.

    Second, the S&P 500 is not affected by the issuance of new stocks. So if Apple increases its market cap by selling more shares, the change won’t affect the S&P 500. For more details about these adjustments, see page 7 of this methods document.↩

  7. More equations for the math oriented; the S&P 500 index scales with market cap according to a power law. Let K_{500} be the total capitalization of the 500 largest US firms. The S&P 500 index (from 1950 onward) is then defined by the following equation: SP500 = 5 \cdot (K_{500})^{0.84} . The existence of this power-law scaling is due to the adjustments that go into calculating the S&P 500.↩

Further reading

Bichler, S., & Nitzan, J. (2013). Francis’ buy-to-build estimates for Britain and the United States: A comment. Review of Capital as Power, 1(1), 73–78. https://capitalaspower.com/2013/02/francis-buy-to-build-estimates-for-britain-and-the-united-states-a-comment/

Francis, J. (2013). The buy-to-build indicator: New estimates for Britain and the United States. Review of Capital as Power, 1(1), 63–72. https://capitalaspower.com/2013/03/the-buy-to-build-indicator-new-estimates-for-britain-and-the-united-states/

Nitzan, J. (2001). Regimes of differential accumulation: Mergers, stagflation and the logic of globalization. Review of International Political Economy, 8(2), 226–274. https://bnarchives.yorku.ca/3/

The post Stocking Up on Wealth … Concentration appeared first on Economics from the Top Down.

Billionaires Are So Predictable

Published by Anonymous (not verified) on Sun, 03/09/2023 - 11:52pm in

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Have you ever wondered what it takes to become a billionaire? Do you need rare genius? Exceptional acumen? Miraculous foresight? An uncompromising work ethic?

On all four counts, the answer is no.

It turns out that to become a billionaire, what you really need is the right social setting. You need to live in a society that is suitably rich and appropriately unequal. Without those things, your chances of wearing the billionaire badge are low.

In this post, I’ll do the math.

Using data from Forbes, I’ll show you how the billionaire headcount varies across countries. Then I’ll show you how to predict this variation. Forget about character traits and personal histories. We don’t need them. To predict how many billionaires a country has, we can get surprisingly far just by knowing the distribution of income.

The Forbes real-time billionaires list: A case study of enshittified data

I don’t usually start a post by lambasting my data sources. But in this case, I’ll make an exception. I’m about to use data that reeks of capitalism. I’m speaking, of course, about the Forbes real-time billionaire list.

Forbes loves capitalism.

Backing up a bit, the über wealthy have immense control over our lives. So you’d think that these folks would be subjected to immense scientific scrutiny. But for the most part, they’re not. Instead, the best source of data on the über wealthy comes from the servants of power — groups like Forbes who make a buck by selling a list of capitalism’s greatest conquerors.

And I do mean selling.

Yes, you’re free to browse the Forbes real-time billionaire list and marvel at how the data gets updated by the second. But when you visit the page, you pay for your time with a barrage of eyeball-gouging ads.

In other words, the Forbes billionaire list is a case study of what Cory Doctorow calls ‘enshittification’ — the process of taking useful stuff and ruining it to make money. Yep, Forbes celebrates how billionaires enshittify society by enshittifying its billionaire-celebrating site with ads. A fitting irony.1

But now to business. However dubious the presentation may be, the Forbes billionaire data is of obvious importance. Fortunately, we can get a computer to clean the Forbes data, separating the billionaire wheat from the adware chaff. Having done that, I find myself with a scrubbed version of the Forbes billionaire list, gathered daily over the last few years.2

Let’s use this data to do some science!

Counting billionaires

The first thing I’ll do with the Forbes data is some basic population biology. Similar to how we can measure the concentration of E. coli in a sample of water, we can measure the concentration of billionaires in a sample of humans. Let’s do that at the country level.

Figure 1 shows billionaire counts per capita for 74 countries. (If a country is absent, that’s because Forbes says it currently has no billionaires.) Each point indicates the average number of billionaires per capita in 2021–2022. Horizontal lines show the billionaire range over that period.

What’s notable about this data is the spectrum of variation between countries. The concentration of billionaires varies over four orders of magnitude — from a high of 80 billionaires per million people in Monaco, to a low of 0.006 billionaires per million people in Bangladesh.

Figure 1: The concentration of Forbes billionaires across countries. This figure uses Forbes data to measure the concentration of billionaires among the world’s countries, circa 2021-2022. Each point indicates the average concentration of billionaires within the corresponding country. (Note that the horizontal axis uses a logarithmic scale.) To construct the billionaire concentration, I divide billionaire counts (measured daily in 2021/2022) by population (measured in 2021). Horizontal lines indicate the 95% range of variation in the billionaire concentration over the observed time interval. (Countries without error bars have only one billionaire observation.) [Sources and methods]

Now, if I was Forbes, I’d take this data and write a puff piece about why Monaco is so great because it has lots of billionaires, and how poor Bangladesh can’t get its act together. But I’m not Forbes. I’m a scientist. And what interests me is why some countries have lots of billionaires and other countries have few.

To unearth this explanation, we’ll head into the mathematical weeds of how wealth and income are distributed. But first, we’ll do something much simpler. It turns out that the billionaire headcount is determined in large part by a single quantity: a country’s average income.

More money, more billionaires

The figure of a billion dollars looms large in our minds, in part because it’s a big number. But to put this sum in perspective, a century ago, no one was talking about ‘billionaires’. Back then, if you were über rich, you were a ‘millionaire’.

Why the lower standard? Because a century ago, everyone had less money. So the threshold for being über rich had a lower dollar value.

The same principle holds across countries today. If you’re a billionaire in a wealthy country like Monaco, you’re certainly a rich person. But you’re not peerless. (Despite having just 36,000 citizens, Monaco has three Forbes billionaires.) However, if you’re a billionaire in a poor country like Bangladesh, in relative terms, you’re unimaginably wealthy. And so the billionaire club is proportionally smaller. (Bangladesh has 170 million people and just one Forbes billionaire.)3

To put this thinking into simple language, compared to poor countries, rich countries ought to have more billionaires.

When we look at the data, we find exactly this pattern. Figure 2 runs the numbers. As GDP per capita increases (horizontal axis), the billionaire headcount goes up (vertical axis). More money, more billionaires.

Figure 2: As countries get richer, they accumulate billionaires. The horizontal axis shows countries’ average income in 2021, measured using GDP per capita. The vertical axis plots the number of Forbes billionaires per capita (measured in 2021–2022). [Sources and methods]

The caveat here is that I’m playing loose with the term ‘rich’. Technically, GDP per capita measures a country’s average income (a flow), while the Forbes list measures billionaires’ wealth (a stock). So when I say ‘more money, more billionaires’, the sticklers might protest that Figure 2 shows something slightly different. And they would be correct.

That said, I have a good reason for mixing up stocks and flows. I do it because that’s how capitalists think. For the über rich, income and wealth are two sides of the same coin.

The ritual of capitalization

If you’re not a member of the über rich, you probably think of ‘wealth’ as a stock of stuff. For example, your neighbor Alice has a big house and a bunch of fancy cars. Alice is rich.

But what about Bob? Two doors down, Bob lives in a modest house and drives an unexceptional car. Is Bob rich? You’d probably say no. But what if you learned that Bob owns billions worth of Microsoft stock? That obviously makes Bob über wealthy. But compared to Alice, the ‘stuff’ of his wealth is far less clear.

Bob, however, is not bothered by this paradox. In fact, he doesn’t even think about the ‘stuff’ he owns. Instead, he looks at his income. Or rather, he looks at Microsoft’s income and then pegs his wealth accordingly. In other words, Bob thinks like a capitalist.

Looking at capitalists like Bob, political economists Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler realize that they are performing a ritual. To peg the value of property rights, investors observe the income stream secured by these rights. Then they take this income stream and divide by a discount rate of their choosing. The result is capitalized value:

\displaystyle \text{capitalized value} = \frac{ \text{future earnings} }{ \text{discount rate} }

Now the catch here is that the capitalization ritual is based on two quantities that are undetermined. Future earnings are, by definition, unknown. And the choice of discount rate is a matter of taste. So we’re left where we started — with a capitalized value that is undefined.

Not to worry. Capitalists solve the problem with customs. They agree to judge future income by looking at recent quarterly earnings. And they choose a discount rate by looking at what everyone else is doing. As a result of this herd behavior, ‘income’ and ‘wealth’ become (statistically) interchangeable.

Figure 3 illustrates the pattern using data from publicly traded US companies, observed over the last 50 years. On the horizontal axis, I’ve plotted each company’s income stream — its quarterly profit, measured relative to the annual average. On the vertical axis, I’ve plotted each company’s capitalized value (again, measured relative to the annual average). When we step back and look at the entire herd of companies, we find a remarkably consistent behavior: more income leads to greater capitalization.

Figure 3: The ritual of capitalization. This figure illustrates how the capitalization ritual gives rise to a tight relation between capitalized value and income. Each point captures quarterly data from a publicly traded US firm. The horizontal axis plots quarterly profit, measured relative to the annual average in the Compustat database. The vertical axis plots the firm’s capitalized value, also measured relative to the annual average. The observation date is indicated by color. Overall, firms’ profit (net income) explains about three quarters of the variation in market value. [Sources and methods]

Now that we understand the ritual of capitalization, let’s return to our billionaires. In Figure 2, we found that the billionaire headcount tends to increase with a country’s per capita income. We now know the reason for this pattern. It arises because income is what gets capitalized into wealth.

Let’s unpack the details. When statistical agencies measure GDP, they capture (among other things) the annual profits of all the companies that reside in the given country. Investors, in turn, take these profits and capitalize them into market value. Finally, Forbes looks at this market value to judge the net worth of the billionaires on its list. The result is a closed loop between aggregate income and billionaire wealth. So as average income grows, countries accumulate more billionaires.

Billionaire excess

In my mind, the most interesting feature in Figure 2 isn’t the GDP-billionaire trend. (A moment’s thought will tell you that the number of billionaires ought to scale with average income.) No, what’s intriguing here is the deviation from the trend.

Relative to their per capita income, some countries have an excess of billionaires, and other countries have a dearth. Why? We’ll get to that in a moment. But first, let’s clarify what we’re talking about when we say ‘excess’ and ‘dearth’ of billionaires.

In technical terms, I’m referring to a ‘regression residual’. Of course, if you’re a not an expert in stats, me throwing around technical terms doesn’t help much. So let’s visualize what I’m talking about. When I say ‘deviation from the trend’ (or ‘regression residual’), I’m referring to the pattern in Figure 4.

Here, the blue points show the cross-country relation between income per capita and the billionaire headcount. The black line indicates the average trend. What interests us is the deviation from this trend, as illustrated by the two red points and their associated red lines.

These red points show the billionaire headcount in Georgia and Qatar. As you can see, both countries have roughly the same number of billionaires per capita. But when we add the context of average income, we find that Georgia and Qatar are not on billionaire par. Relative to its income, Georgia has an excess of billionaires. And Qatar has a dearth.

Figure 4: Measuring billionaire excess and dearth. Blue points plot the relation between (Forbes) billionaire density and GDP per capita. (See Figure 2 for country labels.) The black line shows the regression trend. Based on this trend, we can measure whether a country has too many or too few billionaires, as illustrated by the red lines. Qatar, for example, has a dearth of billionaires. And Georgia has an excess. [Sources and methods]

Using this thinking, we can define what I call the ‘billionaire abundance ratio’ — the ratio between a country’s actual billionaire headcount (per capita) and the billionaire headcount we expect based on the country’s average income.

\displaystyle \text{ billionaire abundance ratio } = \frac{ \text{ actual billionaire headcount} }{ \text{ expected billionaire headcount } }

Throwing our billionaire data into this equation, we get the pattern shown in Figure 5 — the billionaire abundance ratio for every country with a Forbes billionaire.

Figure 5: The billionaire abundance ratio. The billionaire abundance ratio divides the actual billionaire density (based on Forbes data) by the expected billionaire density based on a country’s income per capita. See Figure 4 for an illustration. [Sources and methods]

The billionaire canary

Looking at the billionaire abundance ratio, my guess is that it’s a canary for deeper social structure. Think of it this way: despots need despotism.

For example, it would be weird to find a group of fiercely egalitarian people who, despite their beliefs, all bowed to a despotic king. No, when you see a despot, you’d expect to find a despotic society. Below the king should be a class of opulent aristocrats. And below the ’crats, you’d expect a well-healed upper class. And so on, down the despot line.

The reason we expect this pattern comes down to ideology. If a society believes in egalitarianism, it makes little sense for it to embrace a despot. But if a society celebrates hierarchy, then you’d expect to find a despot, followed by a whole spectrum of less powerful players.

Now in capitalism, we no longer have feudal despots. But there’s still plenty of hierarchy. (In fact, there’s more hierarchy.) And guess who sits at the top of this hierarchy. That would be business despots … otherwise known as billionaires. So in capitalism, the same despot = despotism thinking holds. If a society has an excess of billionaires, it’s probably quite unequal. And if a society has a dearth of billionaires, you’d expect it to be more egalitarian. In short, the relative abundance of billionaires should be a canary for social inequality.

The laws of power

Social inequality. What does that mean and how do we measure it?

This question is a huge can of worms. I’ll only open it a crack.

In a modern context, most people assume that ‘inequality’ refers to the distribution of money, either in the form of income or wealth. Taking this assumption for granted, we’re left with the task of collapsing a distribution of income/wealth into a single number. There’s no ‘best’ way to do it, nor can there be.

The task of measuring inequality is similar to taking a detailed map of a landscape’s topography, and reducing it to a single value. How you do the reducing depends on what you want to achieve.

In the case of social inequality, there’s a variety of measures, ranging from well-known metrics like the Gini index to obscure metrics like the Theil index. At the bottom of the obscurity list is something called the ‘power-law exponent’, which is what I’ll use here.

Now in technical terms, a power-law exponent doesn’t capture ‘inequality’ so much as it quantifies the behavior of a distribution tail. At this point, I’m throwing around a lot of jargon, so let’s move down to earth by asking the following question: how many people have double your wealth?

The question sounds difficult to answer, but is actually quite simple … provided that you are wealthy. If you’re a member of the elite, we can predict how many people have double your net worth using a single parameter which we’ll call \alpha .

For example, if \alpha = 3 , then people with double your wealth are 2^3 = 8 times rarer than you. And if \alpha = 2 , then people with double your wealth are 2^2 = 4 times rarer than you. And so on. Given \alpha , people with double your wealth are 2^{\alpha} times rarer than you.

Now it sounds crazy that we can answer a question about social inequality using grade-school math. And in a sense, it is crazy. But it’s craziness of the empirical kind. You see, it’s an empirical fact that among the elite, the distribution of wealth tends to follow a power law. And the properties of this power law can be summarized using a parameter called \alpha — the exponent in the following equation:

\displaystyle p(x) \sim \frac{1}{x^\alpha}

Here, p(x) describes the probability of finding someone with net worth x . We call this relation a ‘power law’ because of its mathematical form — x raised to some power \alpha .

What’s odd about power laws is that they use grade-school math to describe complex, real-world outcomes. Setting aside why these patterns exist (another can of worms), let’s study an example. As it happens, when we look at the distribution of wealth in the United States, we find a textbook example of a power law. Figure 6 illustrates.

Here, the blue curve shows the distribution of US wealth in 2019 (the most recent year with available data). The horizontal axis indicates individual net worth, measured relative to the median and plotted on a logarithmic scale. The vertical axis indicates the relative abundance of people, also plotted on a log scale.

What interests us most in Figure 6 is the red line. Among US elites, we can accurately model the distribution of wealth with a straight line. Importantly, the line is ‘straight’ in the context of our double log scales. If we do the math, that means we’ve found a power law.4

Figure 6: The distribution of US net worth in 2019. This figure shows a log-log-histogram of US net worth. The horizontal axis plots individual net worth, measured relative to the median net worth and plotted on a log scale. The vertical axis plots, on a log scale, the relative abundance of the corresponding net worth. Blue points indicate the midpoints of net-worth bins. Among the rich, the power-law distribution of wealth is illustrated by the straight red line. [Sources and methods]

In the case of the US circa 2019, the power law has an exponent of \alpha = 2.3 . So if you’re an American elite, someone with double your net worth is about 2^{2.3} \approx 4.9 times rarer than you.

Simple examples aside, what the power-law exponent does is capture the shape of the wealth-distribution tail. A higher exponent indicates a thinner tail. And a lower exponent indicates a fatter tail.

Because it isolates the distribution tail, the power-law exponent gives a unique window into the lives of the über rich. In short, if billionaires are canaries for inequality, their presence should relate to the power-law distribution of wealth.

(Not) predicting billionaire over-abundance with the power-law exponent of wealth

And now I eat my words. Having boldly proclaimed that billionaires are canaries in the inequality coal mine, let’s look at data which says they’re not.

Figure 7 tells the story.

Backing up a bit, recall that we previously calculated the ‘billionaire abundance ratio’ — a country’s billionaire headcount divided by its expected headcount (as predicted by its GDP per capita). Our goal now is to see if wealth inequality, measured using the power-law exponent, can predict this abundance ratio. Looking at Figure 7, the answer is a resounding no. When we plot the billionaire abundance ratio against the power-law exponent of wealth, we get a textbook example of statistical mud.

Figure 7: Power-law exponents for the distribution of wealth don’t explain the billionaire abundance ratio. The horizontal axis shows estimates for the power-law distribution of wealth for the top 1% of individuals within each country. The vertical axis shows the billionaire abundance ratio — the ratio between the number of Forbes billionaires (per capita) and the number of billionaires (per capita) we predict based on a country’s GDP per capita. We expect that the two series should tightly correlate. (A lower power-law exponent indicates a fatter wealth-distribution tail, which should produce more billionaires.) But instead, we find statistical mud. [Sources and methods]

According to Figure 7, the presence of billionaires is almost entirely unrelated to a country’s distribution of wealth. And that strikes me as odd.

You see, there’s a century’s worth of evidence telling us that wealth distributions tend to have a power-law tail. And since billionaires are part of this tail, we ought to be able to predict their relative numbers by looking at the power-law exponent. Yet we cannot. Why?

As you’ll find out, part of the problem is my method. (Power laws are unwieldy beasts.) But a bigger problem is the data itself. In Figure 7, I’ve used wealth data from the World Inequality Database (WID). And if you read the fine print in the WID methods, they warn you that their data is ‘imperfect and provisional’.

Fair enough. But what WID doesn’t disclose is that its wealth data is more ‘imperfect’ and more ‘provisional’ than its income data. That fact is left for the user to find out. Come, let’s have a look.

(Somewhat) predicting billionaire over-abundance with the power-law exponent of income

To understand the strengths and weaknesses of the World Inequality Database, it helps to know its history.

The database began life about a decade ago, as a site that was then called the ‘World Top Incomes Database’. Note the word income. At the time, the database was built to house the research of Thomas Piketty and his collaborators, who were revolutionizing the study of income inequality by getting their hands on juicy income-tax data.

In 2017, the site was rebranded as the ‘World Inequality Database’ — a name that reflected the growing breadth of data. Still, the core strength of the database remained the study of income. So yeah, you can download WID data for the distribution of wealth. But whether you should trust this data is an open question.

In contrast, WID income data appears more reliable. How do I know that? Because the billionaire canaries tell me so.

We can hear their chirp in Figure 8. In this chart, I’ve done the same thing as in Figure 7. But instead of fitting a power law to the distribution of wealth, I’ve fit it to the distribution of income. The results are more satisfying. Our power-law exponents explain at least some of the variation in the billionaire abundance ratio.

Figure 8: Power-law exponents for the distribution of income somewhat explains the billionaire abundance ratio. This figure is similar to Figure 7 in that it compares the billionaire abundance ratio (vertical axis) to a fitted power-law exponent. But instead of fitting this exponent to wealth data, here I fit it to the top 0.1% of incomes. The resulting exponents better predict the billionaire abundance ratio. [Sources and methods]

To summarize, we’ve confirmed our suspicion: the relative abundance of billionaires is a function of social inequality, as measured by the distribution of income. And that means that billionaires are indeed inequality canaries. The problem is that their chirp is frustratingly meager. Why?

The path to semi-non-confusion

The truth about doing science is that it involves a lot of confusion. For every flashy result that makes it into a paper, there are dozens of undocumented wrong turns and dead ends. What I’ve shown you so far is my path to semi-non-confusion.

First, I was confused when I discovered that wealth inequality had nothing to say about the presence of billionaires. I was less confused when I learned that this wealth data was probably flawed, and that income inequality somewhat predicts the presence of billionaires.

Now to the last step. Months into my billionaire research, I remembered that power laws are unwieldy beasts that don’t take kindly to summary statistics. In short, I realized that although you can summarize a power law using the power-law exponent, that exponent doesn’t give you a full description of the beast’s behavior. To observe this behavior, you have to actually apply the power law and let the beast run wild.

Let’s do that now.

Modeling the head of a pin

Although it took me months to realize it, there is a simple way to connect the distribution of wealth (or income) directly to the number of billionaires. I’ll get to the specifics in a moment. But first, let’s start with a metaphor.

Think of the distribution of wealth as a pin with an immaculately thin tip. Our task is to stare at the visible portion of the pin and then predict its shape as we approach the microscopic end. Here’s how we’ll do it. First, we measure how the pin’s thickness decreases as we near the tip. Then we extrapolate this trend into the microscopic region we cannot see. If all goes well, we’ve used macroscopic behavior to predict microscopic patterns.

In this metaphor, the head of the pin is the region where billionaires live. The region is ‘microscopic’ in the sense that billionaires are vanishingly rare, and their numbers are not described by macro statistics about social inequality. That said, we can try to predict the number of billionaires by looking at how the ‘pin’ — the distribution of wealth (or income) — tapers as it approaches the tip. The way we make this prediction is by fitting a power law to the macro-level data, and then extrapolating this power law into the billionaire zone.

Figure 9 illustrates the method. Here, the blue curve shows the US distribution of wealth in 2019. Notice that this curve stops short of describing the zone where billionaires live — the region to the right of the dashed purple line. Still, we can estimate the number of US billionaires using the red line, which shows the best-fit power law. If we extend this power law into the billionaire zone, it will directly predict the number of US billionaires (indicated by the purple shaded region).

Figure 9: Extrapolating the wealth distribution into the billionaire zone. This figure illustrates how we can use the tail of the wealth distribution to predict the number of billionaires. First, we fit the distribution tail with a power law. Then we extrapolate this power law into the region where billionaires live. Finally, we predict the number of billionaires by calculating the area of the purple shaded region. For details, see the Sources and methods.

Now let’s do the math. If we carry out the extrapolation shown in Figure 9, we predict that the US had about 7 billionaires per million people. That’s not far from the Forbes billionaire count — which is around 2.2 billionaires per million people (in 2021).

Of course, the ‘not far’ has to be judged in context. Yes, we’re off by a factor three. But across countries, the billionaire headcount varies by a factor of ten thousand. (See Figure 1.) So predicting this headcount within a factor of three is actually quite good.

(Poorly) predicting the number of billionaires from the power-law distribution of wealth

Before we pat ourselves on the back, we should realize that the United States is typically an outlier, in the sense of having exceptionally good data about wealth (and income) inequality. In other words, prepare yourself for disappointment; when we apply the same billionaire-predicting approach to every country (with available data), we get results that are frustratingly murky.

Figure 10 visualizes the muck. Here, the horizontal axis shows Forbes billionaire headcounts across countries. The vertical axis shows the billionaire headcounts we predict by fitting a power law to each country’s distribution of wealth. Based on the R2 value, we can say that our wealth-based predictions explain about 37% of the variation in billionaire headcounts.

Figure 10: Predicting the number of billionaires from the power-law distribution of wealth. This figure illustrates what happens when we use wealth data from the World Inequality Database to predict the density of billionaires in various countries. The prediction works as follows. First, I fit a power law to the top 1% of the wealth distribution in each country. Then I use this power law to predict the number of billionaires (vertical axis). I’ve compared this prediction to the billionaire count from Forbes data (horizontal axis). If the prediction was perfect, it would fall on the dashed red line. [Sources and methods]

Now in the social sciences, 37% accuracy would usually be deemed fairly good. But in our case, it’s quite bad. Here’s why.

Looking back at Figure 2, we found that a country’s average income explained about 61% of the variation in billionaire headcounts. And average income is a very coarse-grain statistic. So you’d think that by looking at the fine-grain distribution of wealth, we’d be able predict billionaire headcounts with much better accuracy. Yet when we carry out our fine-grain prediction, we get results that are much … worse.

Here’s the upside. Although they’re disappointing, our murky results still tell us something important. In this case, we’ve learned that wealth data from the World Inequality Database is particularly unreliable.5

Capitalizing income (quite accurately) predicts the number of billionaires

Fortunately, we don’t need to end on a downer. With a slight change to our method, we can turn billionaires into predictable vermin. The key is to capitalize income.

Let me explain.

We already know that in the World Inequality Database, the income data is far superior to the wealth data. The problem, though, is that income data does not directly predict the billionaire headcount, which is a feature of the distribution of wealth. But not to worry. We can get the job done by using the ritual of capitalization.

Back in Figure 3, I showed you how investors capitalize companies by looking at their earnings. To judge a company’s market value, investors take the company’s recent profits and divide by a discount rate of their choosing. The result is capitalized value.

Now typically, this ritual is applied to companies. But we can also apply it to individuals. To estimate someone’s wealth, we simply capitalize their income:

\displaystyle \text{ wealth } = \frac{\text{ income} }{\text{ discount rate} }

For example, suppose that someone earns $20 million a year. If we capitalize this income using a discount rate of 5%, we determine that this person is worth $1 billion. We’ve found a billionaire!

Does this method involve a lot of hand waving? Absolutely. But note that it’s the ritual that Forbes uses to peg the wealth of people like Charles Koch. You see, Koch owns a private company — the petroleum conglomerate Koch Industries. And because it is private, Koch Industries has no stock-market value, meaning Charles Koch’s wealth is unknown.

Forbes, however, is not deterred. To estimate (guess) Koch’s wealth, Forbes first capitalizes Koch Industries’ income stream using a discount rate of their choosing. (They claim to infer the discount rate from the market.) Then Forbes uses this capitalized value to estimate (guess) Koch’s net worth. Yes, this procedure is hand wavy. But what else do you expect from a capitalist ritual?

Back to our billionaire predictions. The ritual of capitalization provides a simple way to convert income into wealth. And that means we have a path for using income data to directly predict the number of billionaires.

The steps are nearly the same as before. We fit a distribution of wealth with a power law, and then use this power law to predict the number of billionaires. The difference now is that we derive our wealth data by capitalizing income. I take income data from the World Inequality Database and capitalize it using a discount rate of 5%. Presto! We have a distribution of wealth, and a prediction for the billionaire headcount.

What’s surprising is just how far this hand-waving calculation gets us. As Figure 11 shows, it renders billionaires into predictable pests. By looking at the distribution of income, we can predict the presence of billionaires with startling accuracy.6 7

Figure 11: Predicting the number of billionaires from the power-law distribution of income. This figure illustrates what happens when we use income data from the World Inequality Database to predict the density of billionaires in various countries. The prediction works as follows. First, I fit a power law to the top 0.1% of the income distribution in each country. Then I use this power law to predict the number of billionaires. (Note that to convert income into wealth, I capitalize income using a discount rate of 5%.) I’ve plotted billionaire predictions on the vertical axis. Forbes billionaire counts appear on the horizontal axis. Perfect predictions fall on the dashed red line. [Sources and methods]

After much head-scratching and many dead ends, we’ve finally confirmed what we suspected all along. What Figure 11 shows is that billionaires are socially made.

Here’s the logic. Suppose that apologists for the über rich are right when they assert that most billionaires are ‘self made’. If this claim were true, then their ascent to outrageous wealth shouldn’t depend on the social context. No, by shear force of will, each billionaire bootstraps himself/herself into existence. So if we want to predict the presence of billionaires, we should look at their individual characteristics.

Now to the flaw in this reasoning. In Figure 11, individual characteristics are nowhere to be seen. Instead, we’ve predicted billionaire headcounts by looking at the social environment — the distribution of income. The unavoidable conclusion is that billionaires overwhelmingly owe their existence not to themselves, but to everyone else.

The socially made billionaire: How Forbes falsifies Forbes

There’s something delightfully satisfying about using Forbes data to show that billionaires are socially made. That’s because, perhaps more than any other publication, Forbes loves to swoon over the ‘self-made’ status of the über rich.

For example, in 2021, Forbes breathlessly declared that of the 400 richest Americans, about 70% of them were ‘self-made’. How did Forbes get this value? It turns out that their self-made bar is naively simple: if a billionaire didn’t inherit his/her wealth, Forbes claims that he/she is ‘self-made’.

If only things were so cut and dry. In reality, making the ‘self-made’ claim requires doing far more than demonstrating a billionaire’s lack of inherited wealth. To be ‘self-made’, you also have to show that the billionaire didn’t benefit from their social environment. And that, my friends, is a supremely high bar.

Imagine, for example, how Bill Gates might have done if he hadn’t been born in a rich country like the United States. And imagine if he hadn’t started building his empire at precisely the time that social inequality skyrocketed (in the 1980s). Would Gates still have become the world’s wealthiest person?

For this type of single-person counterfactual, all we can do is guess. But for billionaires as a group, we can do much better. In fact, we can say with reasonable certainty that few of them are self-made. Why? Because we can accurately predict the presence of billionaires using a social criteria — namely, the distribution of income.

The fun part here is that we’re using Forbes data to turn Forbes’ self-made claims on their head. According to Forbes, 70% of billionaires are ‘self-made’. But their own data shows the mirror opposite: variation in the number of billionaires is at least 70% due to the social distribution of income.8

So forget about the personal traits that billionaires love to celebrate. We don’t need them. If we want to understand why billionaires exist, look to the society they inhabit.

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Sources and methods

Forbes billionaires

I’ve been scraping the Forbes billionaire data daily since October 2021. I calculate the number of billionaires per capita using country population data from the World Bank, series SP.POP.TOTL. In Figure 2, GDP per capita data is from the World Bank, series NY.GDP.PCAP.CD.

The ritual of capitalization

Data in Figure 3 is from Compustat, as follows:

  • quarterly profit: series niq
  • quarterly capitalization: the product of common shares outstanding, series cshoq, times the quarterly closing share price, series prccq

To display the data on a common scale, I’ve measured profit and capitalization relative to the respective average for US firms in the Compustat database.

The distribution of income and wealth

Data for the distribution of income and wealth comes from the World Inequality Database, using the following series:

  • thwealj992: wealth thresholds by percentile (reported in local currency)
  • shwealj992: wealth share by percentile
  • tptincj992: income thresholds by percentile (reported in local currency)
  • sptincj992: income share by percentile

I fit power laws to this data using the method outlined by Yogesh Virkar and Aaron Clauset in their paper ‘Power-law distributions and binned empirical data’.

For wealth data, I use a power-law cutoff that corresponds to the top 1% of individuals. For the income data (which is generally more detailed), I use a power-law cutoff that corresponds to the top 0.1% of individuals.

Conversion factors

Forbes reports wealth in US dollars, whereas the World Inequality Database (WID) uses local currencies. When using WID data to predict the number of billionaires, I convert the billionaire threshold into local currency. To get the conversion factor, I use World Bank data, which reports GDP in both US dollars (series NY.GDP.PCAP.CD) and in local currency (series NY.GDP.PCAP.CN).

To convert income into wealth, I ‘capitalize’ income using a discount rate of 5%.

Some power-law math

Here’s a dive into the mathematics of power laws.

Suppose the distribution of wealth follows a power law. The probability of finding someone with wealth x is given by:

\displaystyle p(x) = \frac{ \alpha - 1}{ x_{min} } \cdot \left( \frac{ x }{ x_{min}} \right) ^ {- \alpha}

Here \alpha is the power-law exponent and x_{min} is the lower cutoff for our distribution. (Power laws must have a lower cutoff, otherwise they explode as you approach x = 0 .)

Now let’s do some statistics. Suppose we want to know the portion of individuals with wealth that is greater than (or equal) to some value x . This quantity is defined by the complementary cumulative distribution, which we get by integrating p(x) from x to infinity:

\displaystyle P(x) = \int_x^{\infty} p(x) = \left( \frac{ x }{ x_{min} } \right) ^ {1 - \alpha}

In this case, we want to know the portion of individuals who are billionaires. So we evaluate our complementary cumulative distribution, P(x) , at x = 10^9 . Easy peasy.

The complication comes when we look at real world data. In this case, the power law only describes the tail of the income/wealth distribution. So P(x) describes the portion of billionaires in the distribution tail, rather than the portion of billionaires in the whole population (which is what we want).

Luckily, there’s a simple fix. That’s because I’ve used data from the World Inequality Database to define both the power-law cutoff x_{min} and the power-law exponent \alpha . Importantly, the x_{min} data is associated with a known income/wealth percentile.

For example, suppose we define x_{min} so that it corresponds to the wealth cutoff for the 99th percentile. That means P(x) describes the wealth distribution for the top 1% of individuals. So if we want to know the billionaire fraction in the whole population, we take P(x) and multiply by 1%.

(The assumption here is that x_{min} < 10^9 , meaning only people above x_{min} can be billionaires.)

Discrete problems

Another problem with our function P(x) is that it will predict billionaire fractions that are impossible in the real world.

The issue is that P(x) assumes an infinite population, in which case the billionaire density can range anywhere from 0 to 1. But in the real world where populations are finite, not all values are possible.

For example, suppose a country with 1 million citizens has one billionaire. In this case, the billionaire density is 1 per million. Now suppose that our function P(x) predicts a billionaire density of 0.1 per million. Clearly that value is impossible. The real-world billionaire density can be either 1 per million or none per million.

Actually, it can only be the former. You see, by design, I’m analyzing only the countries that (according to Forbes) have billionaires. So in a country with population p , the minimum billionaire density is 1/p . In contrast, our analytic function P(x) will predict densities that go all the way to zero. As such, when we use this function to predict real-world billionaire density, it will have a downward bias, as shown in Figure 12.

Figure 12: Using an analytic power law to predict discrete, real-world data. This figure shows the bias that occurs when we use an analytic power law to predict the billionaire density in real-world countries. In this case, I use an analytic function for the distribution of wealth. The result is a downward bias, where our function predicts billionaire densities that are too low. (Visually, a significant portion of the blue dots are below the dashed red line.) [Sources and methods]

This bias highlights a general problem with power laws. Their analytic form is simple, yet their real-world behavior can be quite complex.

As a rule, I deal with this complexity problem by using numerical data. In Figures 10 and 11, I predict the billionaire density by sampling data from a continuous power-law distribution, and then counting what portion of the sample are billionaires. You can try your hand at it using the rlpcon function from the R poweRlaw package. If you’re interested, I’ve written a tutorial here.

Notes

  1. Fun fact: when reduced to plain text, the Forbes real-time billionaire list contains about 175 kilobytes of useful information. But to get that data, you have render about 25 megabytes of code. In other words, the Forbes real-time billionaire list is about 99% enshittified.↩
  2. It was my colleague DT Cochrane who suggests recording the Forbes billionaire data. I’m glad he had the idea.↩
  3. The three Monaco billionaires are Stefano Pessina, David Nahmad, and Ezra Nahmad. Bangladesh’s sole Forbes billionaire is Muhammed Aziz Khan↩
  4. Here’s why power laws appear as a straight line when plotted on a double log scale. Let’s start with our power-law equation:

    \displaystyle p(x) \sim \frac{1}{x^\alpha}

    Here, p(x) is the probability of finding someone with wealth x . Taking the logarithm of this probability, we get:

    \displaystyle \log \left( p(x) \right) \sim \log \left( \frac{1}{x^\alpha} \right)

    If we remember the rules of logarithms, we can rewrite the above equation as:

    \displaystyle \log \left( p(x) \right) \sim - \alpha \log(x)

    So the math tells us that the log of wealth probability is linearly proportional to the log of wealth. That’s why power laws look like a straight line when plotted on a log-log scale.↩

  5. The cruel irony is that I’m using slapdash data from Forbes to cast judgement on hard work done by respected scientists.

    What’s clear from the Forbes site is that their billionaire data is meant largely as clickbate. If Forbes was serious about doing science, they’d publish detailed methods. But of course, they don’t. In contrast, the World Inequality Database is a massive scientific project devoted to housing the best estimates of social inequality. But there’s no getting around the fact that their wealth data is deeply flawed.

    To be deemed accurate, the wealth data simply has to predict billionaire numbers better than the crude statistic of a country’s average income. And yet the WID wealth data fails to do so. Why? Likely because the task of estimating the distribution of wealth is exceedingly difficult — the required data is sparse and error prone. In contrast, the task of counting billionaires is fairly straightforward. The stock market does most of the work for us.↩

  6. Detailed oriented readers may wonder why I’m using different power-law thresholds for wealth (top 1%) versus income (top 0.1%). The answer is that the income data is more granular, so we can get deeper into the distribution tail and still have lots of data to work with.↩
  7. In Figure 11 (and to a lesser extent in Figure 10), you’ll notice that in a handful of countries, our billionaire prediction is perfectly accurate. Now in most cases, such perfection would be weird. (Models are almost never perfectly accurate.) But in this case, the perfect predictions arise from the discrete nature of billionaires.

    For example, if a country with 10 million people has one billionaire, the billionaire density will be exactly 0.1 per million. If our model also predicts one billionaire, it will be perfectly accurate.

    Added to this discrete effect is a selection effect in the way I’ve analyzed the data. Because I’m using logarithmic scales to plot the density of billionaires, I’m implicitly excluding countries that have no billionaires. In my power-law model, I do the same. To generate predictions, I repeatedly sample numbers from a power-law distribution. Then I keep only the samples that produce billionaires. So the model basically tells us that if a country has a billionaire, it most likely has n of them.

    Because of this algorithm, perfect billionaire predictions are fairly easy to achieve.↩

  8. There’s good reason to suspect that the socially-made status of billionaires is much higher than 70%. For one thing, by its very nature, ‘wealth’ is a 100% social characteristic. That’s because wealth gains meaning only through comparison. If other people don’t agree to this comparison, then an individual’s ‘wealth’ becomes meaningless.

    But suppose we think in more narrow terms, looking only at our ability to use social inequality to predict the presence of billionaires. Even then, the figure of 70% socially-made is likely an under-estimate. That’s because we need to account for data error.

    We know that the World Inequality Database has flaws. (They admit as much.) And the same goes for the Forbes billionaire list. For example, in our recent study of Canadian billionaires, DT Cochrane and I have found several rich families (the Westons and the Rogers) who are obvious billionaires, yet who are excluded from the Forbes list.

    It stands to reason that with better data, we could push the billionaires-are-70%-socially-made figure much higher.↩

Further reading

Fix, B. (2021a). Economic development and the death of the free market. Evolutionary and Institutional Economics Review, 1–46.

Fix, B. (2021b). The ritual of capitalization. Real-World Economics Review, (97), 78–95.

Nitzan, J., & Bichler, S. (2009). Capital as power: A study of order and creorder. New York: Routledge.

Piketty, T. (2014). Capital in the twenty-first century. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Virkar, Y., & Clauset, A. (2014). Power-law distributions in binned empirical data. The Annals of Applied Statistics, 8(1), 89–119.

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