Even as Israel turns Gaza into dust, few Western celebrities have dared to raise their voices against the genocide – and many have even supported it. One notable exception to this are the Hadids. The family of Palestinian-American fashion designers, influencers and models have been using their considerable platforms to bring attention to the slaughter and to call on the world to act to save innocent civilians. Today, Alana Hadid joins MintCast host Mnar Adley for a frank and insightful discussion about Israel, Palestine, and the world of entertainment.

The family has hundreds of millions of followers on social media and can reach vast sections of the public, particularly young people. This is precisely why Israel fears them so much and has constantly lashed out at them. Israeli soldiers have dedicated missiles they are dropping on Palestine to the Hadids. Images show one that reads, “to [the] Hadid family Mohamed, Bella & Gigi from Israel.”

In the wake of the October 7 Hamas attack, the official Instagram account for the state of Israel attacked Gigi Hadid, claiming that she was “just fine with turning a blind eye to Jewish babies being butchered” – likely a reference to the now debunked “40 beheaded babies” story that was circulating at the time. And Israeli national security minister Itamar Ben-Gvir denounced Bella Hadid as an “Israel hater.” That senior Israeli officials feel the need to go out of their way to go after a family of fashionistas says a great deal about how insecure they feel their position is.

Alana Hadid is a celebrated fashion designer and influencer who has collaborated with many of the world’s most well-known models and brands. Last year, she followed in her younger siblings’ footsteps by debuting as a model at Copenhagen Fashion Week.

Today, she joins Mnar Adley to discuss the ongoing attacks against Palestine, her own family’s history with displacement from their homes, and what it is like to speak out for justice when so many are staying silent.

Don’t miss this episode of the MintCast, and remember to subscribe on whichever platform you view us on.

MintPress News is a fiercely independent media company. You can support us by becoming a member on Patreon, bookmarking and whitelisting us, and subscribing to our social media channels, including YouTube, Twitter and Instagram.

Subscribe to MintCast on Spotify, Apple Podcasts, and SoundCloud.

Also, check out rapper Lowkey’s video interview/podcast series, The Watchdog.

Mnar Adley is an award-winning journalist and editor and is the founder and director of MintPress News. She is also president and director of the non-profit media organization Behind the Headlines. Adley also co-hosts the MintCast podcast and is a producer and host of the video series Behind The Headlines. Contact Mnar at mnar@mintpressnews.com or follow her on Twitter at @mnarmuh.

The post Why Israel fears the Hadid Family, with Alana Hadid appeared first on MintPress News.

What's happened with the Palestinian visa scheme? In response to the parliamentary petition last December, the Home Office declared that "there are no plans to introduce bespoke arrangements for people arriving from the region". But it also added that "those wishing to come to the UK who currently have no visa can apply under one of the existing visa routes".

Advocates for the dedicated Palestinian visa are still pressing the Government to address the challenges faced by those caught in the Israel-Hamas war, amidst the mounting humanitarian concerns as individuals in Gaza are left without viable options for travel. At least 300 British-Palestinian families are grappling with their inability to provide immediate assistance to relatives.

A fresh initiative – the Palestinian Visa Scheme Campaign – has emerged to help families in their efforts to lobby the Government to implement a visa program allowing for the safe relocation of their Gaza-based relatives. 

Speaking at the launch of the project in Westminster on Wednesday, former leader of the Green Party and current Green Party peer, Natalie Bennett said "From an obvious humanitarian point, there are people in desperate need who require refuge". 

"Given that a century of foreign policy has helped to create this situation, we have a real responsibility to take action’" Bennett told Byline Times. She added that ‘‘Everyone who needs refuge should be able to get refuge, whether that includes the Ukrainian, Hong Kong or a Palestinian visa scheme. This is not an either-or".

The Ukrainian Precedent

Since 7 October and the beginning of the Israel-Hamas war, approximately 2,000,000 Palestinians have been displaced in Gaza, which accounts for 85% of the population. Amongst those affected are over 300 UK families waiting to be reunited. A parliamentary petition racked up over 30,000 signatures in support of a scheme supporting these families since its creation in October.

The appeal advocates for the waiver of fees, salary thresholds and testing requirements for Palestinians displaced by Israel's recent attacks on Gaza. Inspired by schemes to support refugees in previous conflicts, it would allow UK residents to offer a home to people fleeing Palestine by becoming a sponsor.

Addressing the committee room on Wednesday, Hamza Elbuhaisi, a British Palestinian whose wife currently lives in the UK through a spouse visa, spoke out against the current issues faced by Palestinian families waiting to be rescued from Gaza.

"Both myself and my wife waited two months to be evacuated by the British foreign office’, Hamza revealed.  "My life was in danger during this time. Israeli airstrikes killed my friends and neighbours, most of them women and children".

Under the current system, the Home Office requires Palestinians seeking refuge in the UK to apply via the established visa channels. Such systems require complicated and costly provisions, such as additional health charges amounting to at least £1,500 per person, as well as the refusal to consider individuals unless they are parents of young UK nationals, spouses, or children of UK citizens. 

Supporters of the scheme point out the contradictory responses of the Government in addressing the needs of displaced populations. Under the Ukrainian visa initiative, Ukrainian refugees seeking residence in the United Kingdom benefit from empathetic provisions, including waived fees and relaxed eligibility criteria. 

Drawing upon the positive implications of the Ukraine visa scheme, Joy Rider from LoveBristol, a church and charity working on the border of Ukraine since March 2022, said that such a scheme "sets a precedent for the British public to actually be able to do something and to be able to make a change".

"Through the Homes for Ukraine Scheme, it created a framework that has been overwhelmingly positive", Rider told Byline Times. "Comparing all the other options available, a visa scheme is one thing we can offer that goes in the opposite spirit of war."

Planning to draft an open letter for MPs, Lords and Life Peers, Natalie Bennett emphasised the need for a bipartisan approach: "It’s essential now to seek cross-party support, seeking allies where we find them."

In November 2023, NATO’s “Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats” published a disturbing ‘working paper,’ “Humour in online information warfare: Case study on Russia’s war on Ukraine.” It received no mainstream attention. Yet, the contents offer unprecedented insight into the military alliance’s insidious weaponization of social media to distort public perceptions and manufacture consent for war. They also raise grave questions about online “trolling” of dissident voices over the past decade and beyond.

The working paper ostensibly “considers instances of humour put to effective use to counter disinformation and propaganda in online spaces, using Russia’s war on Ukraine.” It concludes, “humour-based responses…in the information space and in the physical domain have been found to deliver multiple clear benefits” for Ukraine and NATO.

Avowedly a “practical review seeking to identify examples of best practice from both government and civil society” for wider future application, the paper recommends Western states, militaries, and security and intelligence services master the art of online ridicule under the aegis of “counter-disinformation.”

It contends, “humour…reaches the parts that other countermeasures – like fact-checking or media user education – cannot.” Mass deployment of memes, moreover, “has the advantage of exploiting social media platform algorithms” and addressing “audiences that are not inclined to consume ‘boring’ products.”

As we shall see, the true value in weaponizing “humour” for NATO is distorting the battlefield reality in Ukraine – and future theaters of Western proxy conflict – for public consumption. Meanwhile, any social media user deviating from NATO-endorsed narratives can be subjected to intensive harassment, discrediting them and their message “among a wide sector of online audiences,” if not scaring them away from digital information spaces entirely. The working paper advocates the creation of an army of “private citizens” for the purpose.

‘Incredibly Serious’

The paper begins by noting that “state-backed parody and mockery of the enemy in conflict are nothing new,” citing satirical newspaper Wipers Times, distributed to British soldiers fighting in Western Front trenches during the First World War, and the BBC German Service, which “fought Hitler with humour.” Today though, “social media has democratised access and audience,” therefore “[opening] the playing field to self-motivated private individuals” while “[facilitating] their joining forces in informal collectives for greater effect.”

Multiple footnotes indicate weaponizing mockery is a longstanding NATO objective. A report published by the military alliance in 2017, “StratCom Laughs: in search of an analytical framework,” is cited, while an academic study, “Building a meme war machine: A comparative analysis of memetic insurgencies in cyberspace,” is said to be “forthcoming.” The former caused a mainstream stir upon release. It was, in turn, inspired by a NATO-sponsored paper authored two years earlier by Jeff Giesea, tech guru and Peter Thiel associate, which declared:

Trolling…is the social media equivalent of guerrilla warfare, and memes are its currency of propaganda. Daesh is conducting memetic warfare. The Kremlin is doing it. It’s inexpensive. The capabilities exist. Why aren’t we trying it?”

“StratCom Laughs” was highly influential. In May 2021, the Ukrainian government’s Centre for Strategic Communication and Information Security wholeheartedly endorsed its findings while listing the benefits of “propagandistic humor.”

These included; “[making] perception less critical; [using] common contexts to convey messages with which the audience agrees; [simplifying] everything to the ‘obvious’; [creating] clear groups: strong and intelligent ‘we’ and clumsy and stupid ‘they.’ Of course, the audience associates itself with the former and begins to despise the latter”:

Simplified managed understanding is easily disseminated by the audience and creates the necessary social context for propagandists.”

The cover page of European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats case study, authored by Keir Giles

It’s a highly serendipitous coincidence that the North Atlantic Fella Organization (NAFO) was formed following Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine. The vast, supposedly grassroots Twitter troll collective, identifiable by “doge” profile photos, inexorably blitzes “vatniks” – Russian officials and anyone failing to toe NATO’s line on the Ukraine proxy war – with a vicious blend of absurdity, ad hominem, memes, and ridicule, while raising money for Kiev’s war effort. The group embodies the pronouncements of “Stratcom Laughs” to a T.

NAFO features prominently in the working paper, with some activists quoted at length. It notes that the collective “grew from a fundraising initiative” for the Georgian Legion, a brutal paramilitary faction active in the proxy war. Unmentioned is that independent financing efforts are necessary because formal Western government backing for the group is politically and legally unfeasible. Its members openly boast of committing hideous war crimes, in particular, executing unarmed, bound Russian prisoners of war in cold blood.

NAFO founder Kamil Dyszewski is a Hitler-admiring antisemite who has heroized white supremacist mass murderers. The NATO paper quotes him saying, “all [Russians] see themselves as incredibly serious and important,” so they “struggle with being made fun of.” This perspective tallies perfectly with the military alliance’s perspective on online psychological warfare. The working paper repeatedly argues, “Russian and pro-Russian individuals and entities are intensely sensitive to mockery and show an inability to cope with being the object of derision.”

‘Courage and Resourcefulness’

The working paper judges NAFO to be an “ideal structure and format” for “countering disinformation, largely through the application of humour and mockery.” The group’s efforts were moreover found to “provide the base material for memes in the form of first-hand images and videos of Russian failures or Ukrainian determination.” This capability augmented “the responsiveness and impact” of Kiev’s “information campaigns,” which were, for example, “instrumental” in securing “US-made F-16 combat aircraft” in August 2023.

These excerpts are striking, for throughout the first 18 months of the proxy conflict, “Russian failures” and “Ukrainian determination” absolutely dominated Western media coverage of the war. The narrative that the invasion was an unmitigated disaster and huge embarrassment for Moscow in every way, and Kiev could pull off a spirited underdog victory and repel the invaders, if not ultimately march upon the Kremlin, as long as sufficient Western Wunderwaffe arrived, was universal and indomitable.

In reality, while there were undoubtedly “Russian failures” and “Ukrainian determination” aplenty from the start, Kiev was economically and militarily crippled within weeks. The “Special Military Operation” was concerned not with conquering every inch of the country but with compelling Volodymyr Zelensky’s government to implement the Minsk Accords and declare neutrality. This was almost achieved in April 2022 via Turkey-brokered peace talks. But then-Prime Minister of the UK Boris Johnson flew to Kiev, offering the Ukrainians the blankest of blank cheques to keep fighting.

The scale of Ukraine’s losses, the dire situation for the country from day one of Russia’s invasion, and British and American intelligence connivances that produced the conflict, concealed from Western audiences by their governments and media, meant siding with and arming Kiev appeared to be the objectively sensible, reasonable, moral position. After all, they were fighting an enemy that embodied absolute evil and incompetence. Helpfully, NAFO was always on hand to relentlessly remind the public of both qualities – particularly the latter.

“Stratcom Laughs” had triumphed. Public perceptions were rendered “less critical.” Serious, complex questions were simplified to “the obvious.” “Clear groups” were created – “strong and intelligent ‘we’ and clumsy and stupid ‘they.’” And Western audiences, “of course,” associated themselves with the former while “despising” the latter. Fast forward to today, and mainstream polls indicate that just one in ten Europeans believe Ukraine can win, with most believing a “compromise settlement” is the only way to end the conflict.

In June 2023, Ukraine launched a “counteroffensive.” Originally intended to start months earlier, it was much delayed due to adverse weather conditions and late weapon deliveries. Officials in Kiev, many Western journalists and pundits, and NAFO all heavily hyped the effort in advance. The group published many memes – some promoted a beach party for “fellas” in Crimea that Summer and others depicted “orcs” fleeing from swarms of leopards.

The latter played on a trope that Ukrainian political and military chiefs and the Western media were extremely keen to perpetuate – that Moscow’s soldiers, terrified of German Leopard 2 tanks, would abandon their positions as the armored vehicles advanced. Instead, they were easily blown to smithereens by extensive minefields created by Russian forces while they waited for the counteroffensive to commence and low-cost lancet drones.

Within just a month, Ukraine had lost 20% of the vehicles and armor supplied by the West, with nothing to show for it. This remained the case when the counteroffensive fizzled out at the end of 2023, with just 0.25% of the territory occupied by Russia in the initial phase of the invasion regained. Meanwhile, casualties may have exceeded 100,000. This can only be considered an absolutely horrendous catastrophe from every angle.

The Washington Post published an extensive post-mortem on the counteroffensive in December of that year. It is clear that among other failures, a fatal error in planning for the effort – overseen by the Pentagon – was the assumption that the Russians would flee in many areas. No alternative scenarios were considered. The Wall Street Journal has also highlighted other egregious strategic shortcomings, which made the counteroffensive’s calamity inevitable:

Western military officials knew Kyiv didn’t have all the training or weapons – from shells to warplanes – that it needed to dislodge Russian forces. But they hoped Ukrainian courage and resourcefulness would carry the day.”

It seems Ukrainians were dispatched on a suicide mission because Western military apparatchiks bought into the simplistic, misleading propaganda narrative of “Russian failures” versus “Ukrainian determination.” Courage and resourcefulness are admirable qualities that Ukrainians have consistently exhibited since February 2022. But they are no match – let alone substitute – for landmines, tanks, fighter jets, artillery shells, and other weapons of war. That confirming this self-evident fact came at the cost of so many lives is a criminal tragedy.

Nobody has all the details but one thing is clear: this counteroffensive will rewrite military history.#Ukraine has stuff in the pipeline the Russians will never see coming. And much of what they do see coming, they won’t be able to stop anyway. #SpringIsComing

— Jessica Berlin (@berlin_bridge) May 6, 2023

‘Punching Upwards’

Throughout the working paper, axiomatic reference is made to how weaponizing humor “imposes costs” on “adversaries” and “aggressors.” Contradictorily, though, it is conceded that “the direct impact on Russia itself is hard to measure.” Indeed, it seems implausible that Kremlin officials and Russian soldiers on the frontline suffer any “costs” whatsoever from the mockery of anonymous Western social media users. This begs the obvious questions of why this approach is considered effective and who the true “adversaries” in NATO’s comedic crosshairs are.

A clue is offered by a passage celebrating how “the overall effect of a community built around humour has been to turn the tables on social media platforms.” As a result, “the agents of influence and other servants of authoritarian regimes, who for so long held the advantage, are turned into the targets rather than the deliverers of mockery and abuse”:

This causes both Russian officials and their extended network of influencers, enablers and trolls to realise that if they choose to serve a criminal regime, they expose themselves to mass ridicule and mockery.”

For “influencers, enablers and trolls,” read: anti-war, anti-NATO, anti-Empire journalists, researchers, activists, and private citizens who dare express the “wrong” opinions or expose inconvenient truths online that challenge NATO-endorsed narratives. This is certainly the case in my regard. The working paper cites me curtly, responding to puerile abuse from a detractor on Twitter as an example of how “those who oppose Russia, China or other hostile regimes publicly face consequences by the hostile regime itself or by its agents and sympathisers.”

Elsewhere, the paper endorses harassment, stalking, doxxing, and creating parody accounts of such “influencers, enablers and trolls” while also warning these are “potential hazards” faced by “individuals taking on authoritarian propaganda structures.” A NAFO activist is quoted as saying, “I’ve seen people get doxxed and harassed, and it doesn’t look fun. I want my family to be safe.” This sentiment is no doubt shared by NAFO’s many targets – but as they “serve a criminal regime,” they’re fair game from NATO’s perspective.

British Ministry of Defence apparatchik Keir Giles authored the working paper. It reveals he “briefly tried to earn a living as a stand-up comedian,” so “knows what it feels like when a joke falls flat.” An apologia he recently authored for Baltic state Nazi collaborators implicated in the Holocaust, in which he claimed they are misunderstood, was certainly not received with much humor. He has promoted the output of a dedicated parody account of none other than myself for some time.

Ironically enough, I would’ve found the account’s posts amusing if they were actually funny. Instead, it has mocked the victims of sexual abuse and also dabbled in antisemitism. In late January, the parody account published a post mocking me for being tormented as a child over my name. Little did I know these lame attempts at ridicule were a dedicated NATO psychological warfare operation.

The latter post gained little traction, and in response, many Twitter users expressed shock and revulsion at such playground bullying behavior. This highlights another shortcoming of NAFO’s approach – the group’s visceral, unabashed, genocidal hatred of Russia and all Russians is so extreme that they frequently repulse audiences to the extent of making them ask if they’re supporting the wrong side by backing Ukraine. Moreover, as Aleksei Navalny ally Leonid Volkov has observed, this output actively assists the Kremlin’s propaganda strategies.

Left-wing alternative comedy legend Stewart Lee has written about the paucity of right-wing standup comedians. He attributes this deficit to right-wing politics being overwhelmingly concerned with punching downward, which is simply unfunny bullying when performative comedy is “a heroic little struggle,” which “should always be punching upwards”:

Who could be on a stage, crowing about their victory and ridiculing those less fortunate than them without any sense of irony, shame or self-knowledge? That’s not a stand-up comedian. That’s just a c***.”

This may well explain why Keir Giles failed in his quest to become a standup comedian and why his “jokes” continue to fall flat to this day. But for all those who oppose war, his working paper is no laughing matter. It is advocacy for the military alliance to create a permanent online harassment battalion to inflict psychological, emotional, personal and professional damage on them while convincing decent people to hate the oppressed and cheer the oppressors.

Keir Giles was repeatedly approached for comment by MintPress News for comment, but did not respond prior to publication.

Feature photo | Keir Giles is pictured with NAFO meme mascot, the NAFO doge | Illustration by MintPress News

Kit Klarenberg is an investigative journalist and MintPress News contributor exploring the role of intelligence services in shaping politics and perceptions. His work has previously appeared in The Cradle, Declassified UK, and Grayzone. Follow him on Twitter @KitKlarenberg.

The post From Memes to Doxxing: Unmasking NATO’s Information Warfare Strategy appeared first on MintPress News.

The Intelligence Committee under the President of Ukraine, warned in a statement on 27 February 2024, of Russia's plans to undermine Ukraine using information operations to divert global attention from the ongoing war. According to the statement, objectives include spreading false narratives about Ukraine and its partners, demoralizing Ukrainians, sowing panic, and creating divisions in military and civilian spheres.

Russian special services spent $1.5 billion on information operations in November 2023, with $250 million for the ‘Maidan-3’ special operation on Telegram. Maidan-3 is due to peak in March-May 2024, intensifying global destructive narratives, questioning government legitimacy, spreading panic, creating artificial divisions, causing discord with allies, and promoting conspiracy theories. Ukrainian security services are calling for joint resistance and comprehensive security measures, especially in the information space, to counter global threats from Russia's ongoing hybrid war.

One of Russia's most widespread tactics is the “Doppelgänger bot network” in which state actors utilize Doppelgänger bots on X/Twitter to disseminate misleading narratives, sow discord, and influence public opinion globally. Researchers have revealed the scale, methods, and adaptability of this disinformation campaign, emphasizing its impact on Western democracies.

“A Dark Double”

In 2022, EU DisinfoLab revealed a Russia-based influence operation active in Europe. The operation was cleverly named Doppelgänger. German folk legends considered a “doppelgänger” a shadow, a malevolent entity, offering deceptions and lies. In a less romantic twist, the Kremlin state-sponsored actors mimicked authentic publications, cloning at least 17 genuine media outlets like Bild and The Guardian. They used fake, look-alike domain names and designs to create “a double” garnished with fake articles, videos, and polls.

The Doppelgänger network uses a cross-platform approach, operating across web pages and social media networks (Facebook, X/Twitter, YouTube), employing diverse formats such as videos and online ads, to build a mirror labyrinth, using repetition as a mechanism for forming a parallel reality.

At the core of the operations are fake websites. They post the original fabrication, and social media platforms jump in, echoing and amplifying the impact. The content is usually comprised of three elements:

The elements are coordinated between Doppelgänger assets across the platforms.

Since 2022, several research groups have been tracing thousands of Doppelgänger bots operating on various platforms. A US group, dTeam, followed Twitter/X campaigns in Ukrainian, German, French, and English languages, providing the discovered data to various US government partners, including the FBI and DSG (Department of Security and Governance). The Insikt Group identified several Twitter/X campaigns targeting various demographics in early November 2023. WIRED obtained data from two disinformation research groups revealing a coordinated Russian Doppelgänger bots’ effort on Telegram and X/Twitter.

All the researchers came up with mind-boggling revelations.

How Doppelgänger Bot Networks Operate

Attacks aim to undermine trust in the authenticity of social media interactions, manipulate online conversations, and influence public sentiment. Artificially inflated follower counts may also be leveraged for deceptive purposes.

The network can generate up to 5,000 new Doppelgänger bot accounts within a few hours on a single day. Doppelgänger bots clone the profiles of ordinary users to create realistic-looking fake identities. The network initially faked celebrity accounts: in the latest campaign, it created and disseminated memes in many languages depicting stars denouncing Western aid to Ukraine. The majority of engineered accounts mimic regular users, making it challenging for the average social media user to discern between genuine and fake profiles.

There are two types: content poster accounts, also known as primary bots, generate posts, memes, and videos. Quote bot accounts amplify the impact by replying and reposting the original content. The operational structure involves the content poster accounts creating a three-layered post on X/Twitter: an initial link to articles, a follow-up comment, and a subsequent link to visual content. This approach enhances the reach and impact of disinformation.

The network demonstrates continual activity without a single break exceeding three days. For instance, during the last week of January 2024, approximately 1,000 bots were suspended by X/Twitter. After a pause, they resumed activity on 31 January, unveiling new content and a fresh set of bots. X/Twitter suspends the accounts, and the researchers utilize downtime as an opportunity to carry out continuous tracking for data collection and comprehensive documentation.

The campaign adapts narratives to target diverse demographics, impacting many regions around the globe.

Objectives and Narratives

All Russian malicious actors' networks have the objective of sowing unrest and chaos in Western democracies, but the narratives vary depending on the demographic targeted. The networks create, promote, and amplify narratives supporting far-left and far-right groups and causes. Campaigns attack the EU, NATO, the US, the UK, and Canada. They disseminate narratives portraying Ukraine as “not a democracy,” “corrupt,” “losing the war,” and emphasizing “forced conscription”. They attempt to influence politicians and the global community to withdraw support for Ukraine by propagating domestic issues, such as “our tax dollars support corrupt Ukraine, leaving veterans homeless”.

Targeting Ukraine

A campaign aimed at impersonating reputable Ukrainian news organizations, including the Ukrainian Independent Information Agency of News, or UNIAN, Obozrevatel, and RBC-Ukraine, targeted Ukrainian citizens. According to Insikt Group research, tactics employed “brandjacking and utilizing well-crafted domains to mimic authentic news organizations.”

The researchers observed common themes across articles: emphasizing Ukrainian military struggles, and portraying Ukraine’s western allies as unreliable. Some accounts promoted images and memes critical of President Zelensky, attempted to spread a rumor that Ukrainian former commander-in-chief General Valeriy Zaluzhny was planning to run for President in 2024 and alleged that Zaluzhny would win if elections were held.

The researchers found out that the campaign impersonating Obozrevatel created and amplified malign narratives such as emphasizing the alleged US prioritization of Israel over Ukraine, questioning the EU's ability to manage multiple conflicts, and predicting a discouraging future for Ukraine's military prospects.

In a fake version of UNIAN, the content creators portrayed Ukraine’s military strategy as weak, expressed doubts about Ukraine’s ability to win, and exaggerated the casualty rate among Ukrainian soldiers.

In the RBC-Ukraine fake articles, the impersonators implied that western support for Ukraine is waning, suggested the US is considering redirecting military aid from Ukraine in support of Israel, and criticized Ukraine’s alleged military recruitment expansion amid personnel shortages.

Insikt Group identified over 800 social media accounts engaged in automated Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior (CIB). Almost every account followed a similar username model: firstname[letter][roughly 5 or 6 digits]. The majority of accounts recycled common Western first names like "jeff," "donald," "donna," or "dorothy." All accounts were registered on the social media platform in October 2023. The network displayed a reliance on two stages of link obfuscation, likely aimed at evading detection.

Targeting the US

In the US, Russian state-sponsored malicious actors are attempting to influence the presidential election of 2024 with inauthentic news outlets focused on US politics and elections. Usually, they claim to be a non-partisan source to build credibility, the Insikt Group reported. Articles, potentially AI-generated, criticize the Biden administration, suggesting its waning popularity. One fake publication, MyPride, published an inauthentic editorial outlet critical of LGBTQ+ rights in the US, fueled hostile rhetoric with articles portraying LGBTQ+ activism negatively, and criticized the US military's inclusivity.

WIRED obtained data from two disinformation research groups revealing a coordinated Russian effort on Telegram and X/Twitter to exacerbate tensions by pushing the narrative of the US being on the brink of civil war.

Starting in late January 2024, after the US Supreme Court ruled in favor of President Joe Biden’s administration on a Texas border issue, Russian politicians spoke of a “bloody civil war”, “the weakening of US hegemony” and a “People’s Republic of Texas.” Russian state media, influencers, and bloggers amplified these narratives.

A network of bot accounts previously associated with the Doppelgänger campaign joined the discussion of the Texas border issue on X/Twitter. It differed from the previous Doppelgänger campaigns which shared links to fake websites mimicking legitimate ones. The Texas border campaign linked to websites run by Doppelgänger operatives. These websites published articles tailored to the desired narrative. For instance, an article on the fake site Warfare Insider claimed Texas had become a symbol of the clash between state and federal authorities.

Targeting Germany

In Germany, the focus of disinformation campaigns was on European migration challenges, global migration, disseminating content stoking nationalist and anti-immigrant sentiment, predicting further migration due to environmental disasters and the war in Ukraine, suggesting the German government's failure in managing the refugee crisis, exploiting political polarization, portraying Ukraine as a source of German political divisions, as the Insikt Group research showed.

The campaign aimed to cast doubt on NATO unity and effectiveness, criticizing German leadership and military spending. Narratives of impending economic decline, casting doubt on the effectiveness of sanctions against Russia, and portraying the rise of the far-right Eurosceptic party AfD as a response to government failures, were prevalent. The networks used German-language inauthentic news outlets Besuchszweck, Grenzezank, Haüyne Scherben.

Countermeasures: Addressing the Doppelgänger Threat

X/Twitter suspension efforts are ongoing but have proved insufficient in preventing the creation of new bot batches. The strategy of suspending fake accounts after content has been posted is deemed ineffective as the damage has been inflicted. The resilience of the network in generating new accounts and its adaptability pose a challenge to mitigation efforts.

The Doppelgänger bot strategy is aimed at changing the political landscape by influencing public opinion and changing behaviour. It is broadly employed as a weapon in Russian information warfare. According to researchers, the tactics evolve and include innovative technologies, such as the use of first- and second-stage websites, the creation of original but inauthentic news organizations, and the use of AI.

Urgent countermeasures are essential. Increased awareness, information warfare literacy, and further research are crucial components in mitigating the impact of the Russian Doppelgänger threat. Researchers call for urgent, adaptive countermeasures against this persistent and increasingly sophisticated threat to democratic institutions.